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ARTICLE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
RIPPLES
MIKE KOEHLER*
An obvious reason to comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("FCPA") is that non-compliance can expose a company to a criminal
or civil FCPA enforcement action by the Department of Justice
("DOJ") and/or the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC').
However, this Article highlights that settlement amounts in an actual
FCPA enforcement action are often only a relatively minor component
of the overall financial consequences that can result from FCPA
scrutiny or enforcement in this new era.
By coining a new term of art - the "three buckets" of FCPA financial
exposure - and through various case studies and examples, this Article
demonstrates how FCPA scrutiny and enforcement can impact a
company's business operations and strategy in a variety of ways from:
pre and post-enforcement action professional fees and expenses; to
market capitalization; to cost of capital; to merger and acquisition
activity; to impeding or distracting a company from achieving other
business objectives; to private shareholder litigation; to offensive use of
the FCPA by a competitor or adversary to achieve a business objective
or to further advance a litigating position.
* Mike Koehler is an Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law.
Professor Koehler is the founder and editor of the FCPA Professor website
(www.fcpaprofessor.com) and his FCPA expertise and views are informed by a decade
of legal practice experience at a leading international law firm. The issues covered in
this article assume the reader has sufficient knowledge and understanding of the FCPA,
as well as FCPA enforcement, including the role of the Department of Justice and
Securities and Exchange Commission in enforcing the FCPA and the resolution
vehicles typically used to resolve FCPA scrutiny. Interested readers can learn more
about these topics, and others, by reading Mike Koehler, The Fa(ade of FCPA
Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907 (2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cftn?abstract_id=1705517. The author's FCPA Professor website is also a useful
resource for FCPA developments and analysis, specifically the "FCPA 101" page of
the site (http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101).
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This Article thus shifts the FCPA conversation away from a purely legal
issue to its more proper designation as a general business issue that
needs to be on the radar screen of business managers operating in the
global marketplace. By highlighting the many ripples ofFCPA scrutiny
and enforcement, it is hoped that more business managers can view the
importance of FCPA compliance more holistically and not merely
through the narrow lens of actual enforcement actions.
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INTRODUCTION
An obvious reason to comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("FCPA") is that non-compliance can expose a company to a criminal or
civil FCPA enforcement action by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and/
or the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").However, this Article
highlights that settlement amounts in an actual FCPA enforcement action
are often only a relatively minor component of the overall financial
consequences that can result from FCPA scrutiny or enforcement in this
new era.
This Article is guided by the below picture which best highlights the
financial consequences that can result from FCPA scrutiny or enforcement.
In short, think of the drop of water as being FCPA scrutiny or enforcement




Part I of this Article coins a new term of art the "three buckets" of
FCPA financial exposure - and examines various financial consequences
that directly result from FCPA scrutiny or enforcement. The "three
buckets" are: (i) pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses;
(ii) settlement amounts in an actual FCPA enforcement action; and (iii)
post-enforcement action professional fees and expenses. Of these "three
buckets," while settlement amounts in an actual FCPA enforcement action
tend to get the most attention, pre-enforcement action professional fees and
expenses are often the most expensive aspect of FCPA scrutiny and
enforcement largely because of the "where else" question.
Part II of this Article further adds to the overall financial consequences
that can result from FCPA scrutiny or enforcement and uses various case
studies and examples to demonstrate how FCPA scrutiny and enforcement
can further negatively impact a company's business operations and strategy
in a variety of ways from: market capitalization; to cost of capital; to
merger and acquisition activity; to impeding or distracting a company from
achieving other business objectives; to private shareholder litigation; to
offensive use of the FCPA by a competitor or adversary to achieve a
business objective or to further advance a litigating position.
This Article accepts the fact that FCPA scrutiny and enforcement results
in many other ripples in this new era. Yet, throughout this Article many
questions are posed regarding the legitimacy of certain ripples. Moreover,
while it is beyond the focus of this Article, it must nevertheless be
highlighted that because of the many ripples of FCPA enforcement, it is
important that FCPA enforcement be subjected to meaningful judicial
scrutiny and that enforcement actions represent legitimate instances of
provable FCPA violations, not merely settlements entered into for reasons
of risk aversion. This would seem like an obvious statement. However, the
reality is that the majority of corporate FCPA enforcement actions in this
new era are based on aggressive and controversial enforcement theories,
yet resolved via non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements
(NPAs / DPAs) not subjected to any meaningful judicial scrutiny by risk-
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averse business organizations mindful of the adverse consequences of
putting the enforcement agencies to its burden of proof in an adversarial
proceeding.'
Regardless, by examining the FCPA's many other ripples, this Article
shifts the FCPA conversation away from being a purely legal issue to its
more proper designation as a general business issue that needs to be on the
radar screen of business managers operating in the global marketplace. By
highlighting the many ripples of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement, it is
hoped that more business managers can view the importance of FCPA
compliance more holistically and not merely through the narrow lens of
actual enforcement action.
I. THE "THREE BUCKETS" OF FCPA FINANCIAL EXPOSURE
An obvious reason to comply with the FCPA is that non-compliance can
expose a company to a criminal or civil FCPA enforcement action by the
DOJ and/or SEC. However, settlement amounts in an actual FCPA
enforcement action are often only a relatively minor component of the
overall financial consequences that can result from FCPA scrutiny or
enforcement in this new era.
Part I of this Article coins a new term of art - the "three buckets" of
FCPA financial exposure - and examines various financial consequences
that directly result from FCPA scrutiny or enforcement in this new era.
The below pictures best highlight the "three buckets" of FCPA financial
exposure in terms of typical magnitude in relation to each other.
1. For additional reading on this troubling aspect of FCPA enforcement, see, e.g.,
Mike Koehler, The Fagade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907 (2010),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1705517; see also,
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act] (statement of Michael B. Mukasey, Partner, Debevoise
& Plimpton LLP) available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/
sites/1/Mukasey061420 1.pdf; Mike Koehler, Former Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales Criticizes Various Aspects Of DOJ FCPA Enforcement, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/former-attorney-general-alberto-
gonzales-criticizes-various-aspects-of-doj-fcpa-enforcement; Mike Koehler, DOJ





Pre-enforcement action Enforcement action Post-enforcement action
professional fees and expenses settlement amounts professional fees and expenses
A. Pre-Enforcement Action Professional Fees and Expenses
Every instance of FCPA scrutiny has a point of entry - in other words, a
set of facts that give rise to the scrutiny in the first place. This point of
entry is often the beginning of a long and expensive journey for the
company under scrutiny and the first bucket of FCPA financial exposure is
pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses.
For instance, in 2008, beauty products company Avon disclosed that it
was conducting an FCPA internal investigation regarding compliance in
China.2 As is typical, the investigation soon spread to other countries, and
six years later the internal investigation is still active and the company has
disclosed approximately $350 million in pre-enforcement action
professional fees and expenses.3
Wal-Mart's FCPA scrutiny has resulted in even higher pre-enforcement
action professional fees and expenses. In late 2011, Wal-Mart disclosed
that it was conducting an FCPA internal investigation concerning certain
permitting, licensing and inspection issues in Mexico.4 Wal-Mart's scrutiny
has likewise followed a typical pattern in that the company's internal
review expanded beyond Mexico and the company's pre-enforcement
action professional fees and expenses began to skyrocket. During 2013, the
company made various disclosures regarding its FCPA scrutiny including
2. Avon Prods., Inc. Quarterly Report (Form 10 - Q) (Oct. 30, 2008) available at
http://investor.avoncompany.com/Cache/22219072.pdfH1D=3009091&FID=22219072
&O=3&OSID=9 (follow "SEC Filings" hyperlink: then search "10-Q for "2008").
3. See, e.g., Peter Henning, The Mounting Costs of Internal Investigations, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/the-mounting-costs-of-
internal-investigations/ (discussing pre-enforcement action professional fees and
expenses as of March 2012).
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the following:
On FCPA, we continue to work closely with anticorruption compliance
experts to review and to assess our programs and help us implement
concrete steps for each particular market. In the various markets, these
experts have spent tens of thousands of hours on anti-corruption support
and training.
Each quarter of 2013, Wal-Mart disclosed its pre-enforcement action
professional fees and expenses and quarterly totals equated to the company
spending approximately $1.25 million per working day on its FCPA
scrutiny.6 Most recently, Wal-Mart disclosed anticipated expenses in 2014
of $200 to $240 million in connection with its FCPA scrutiny.7
It is not just large multinationals subject to high-profile FCPA scrutiny
that are spending millions of dollars in pre-enforcement action professional
fees and expenses every year. For instance, beverage company Beam Inc.
disclosed approximately $4.2 million in one year for "legal, forensic
accounting, and other fees related to [its] internal investigation into FCPA
compliance in [its] India operations."8
Comparing pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses to
settlement amounts is not possible in all cases as companies have different
disclosure requirements and practices. However, where a comparison is
possible, it is clear that pre-enforcement action professional fees and
expenses are typically the greatest financial consequence to a company
resolving an FCPA enforcement action. For instance, RAE Systems
resolved a coordinated DOJ and SEC enforcement action by agreeing to
pay a combined $2.95 million in settlement amounts.9 In connection with
this FCPA scrutiny, the company disclosed $4.2 million in pre-enforcement
action professional fees and expenses.' 0
While the ratio of pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses
5. Wal-Mart Fourth Quarter Fiscal Year 2013 Earnings Call, WAL-MART
STORES, INC. (Feb. 21, 2013) [hereinafter Wal-Mart Q4 Earnings Call], available at
http://cdn.corporate.walmart.com/63/1a/46Idlfa2470fa596b46198e72886/management
-earnings-call-transcript.pdf.
6. Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 16, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-88.
7. Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/ftiday-roundup- 109.
8. Beam Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789073/000119312513076953/d457573dl0k.
htm.
9. Mike Koehler, The Former CFO of RAE Systems Speaks, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-former-cfo-of-rae-systems-speaks.
10. Id.
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to enforcement action settlement amount in RAE Systems was relatively
modest, such ratios have exceeded 10:1 or even greater. For instance, in the
NATCO enforcement action the company agreed to pay a $65,000 civil
penalty to resolve an SEC enforcement action. The company's pre-
enforcement action professional fees and expenses were reported to be $11
million and caused the company cash-flow problems." Likewise, in the
Veraz Networks enforcement action, the company agreed to pay a
$300,000 civil penalty to resolve an SEC enforcement action. The
company's pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses were
approximately $3 million.'
The above examples highlight the fact that pre-enforcement action
professional fees and expenses are typically the most expensive aspect of
FCPA scrutiny and enforcement. The question is why are pre-enforcement
action professional fees and expenses so expensive?
Resolution documents from an FCPA enforcement action against
telecommunication company Alcatel-Lucent provide insight into the
expansive nature of FCPA scrutiny. The DOJ noted:
At the request of the government, [Alcatel-Lucent] undertook a 'Global
Review' to evaluate its relationship with agents, interactions with
government officials, and gifts, travel and entertainment provided in
countries around the world.... In particular, Alcatel-Lucent and its
outside counsel conducted investigations of 34 countries around the
world to uncover potential misconduct. The internal investigation
examined Alcatel-Lucent's agent and consultant approval, review, and
termination processes, the activities of a number of terminated agents,
and the knowledge and involvement of senior management in any
potential wrongdoing. This effort was closely coordinated with the
government.... [As part of its agent and consultant approval process
review], Alcatel-Lucent retained an independent investigative firm to
review all of Alcatel-Lucent's 300 then-existing agents and
consultants.... Additionally,.. . Alcatel-Lucent commenced a review of
its Board of Directors' and other senior management's knowledge of,
and involvement in, any of the wrongdoing. As part of this review,
interviews were conducted of 26 individuals who were either current
high-ranking members of Alcatel-Lucent's management, former high-
ranking members of Alcatel's management, or were in a position to
11. Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket, FORBES (June 7, 2010, 12:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-washington-extortion-
mendelsohn-bribery-racket.html.
12. Mike Koehler, Disconnected. . . Another Telecommunications Company Settles





provide information relevant to the review. Alcatel-Lucent and its
counsel also reviewed documents collected from these individuals....
Overall, Alcatel-Lucent's outside counsel interviewed over 330
witnesses as part of these investigations, collected data from 201
individuals, and reviewed over 2 million documents, of which over
200,000 documents were produced to the government.13
As hinted at above, a main reason pre-enforcement action professional
fees and expenses are typically the most expensive aspect of FCPA scrutiny
and enforcement is because of the "where else" question. The "where else"
question generally works as follows: A company voluntarily discloses to
the enforcement agencies specific conduct that occurred in country X that
could implicate the FCPA. Before the enforcement agencies will agree to
resolve any enforcement action concerning the conduct in country X, the
enforcement agencies will often ask "where else." In other words, if the
conduct giving rise to FCPA scrutiny occurred in country X, how do the
enforcement agencies know that similar conduct did not also occur in
countries A, B, C, D, etc. In short, the "where else" question asked in
instances of FCPA scrutiny often results in a company conducting a world-
wide compliance review of its entire operations.
Because cooperation with the government's investigation is an important
factor the enforcement agencies weigh in deciding whether to bring an
enforcement action, 14 business organizations invariably, yet reluctantly,
accept FCPA counsel's recommendation to broaden the internal
investigation to best demonstrate cooperation. The next thing the company
knows, it is paying for a team of lawyers (accompanied by forensic
accountants and other specialists) to travel around the world to answer the
"where else" question even though the voluntary disclosure that started the
whole process involved specific conduct in a specific country.
Where an instance of FCPA scrutiny is prompted by board of director or
senior executive conduct that raises the possibility of a culture of
corruption within a company or conduct that otherwise suggests
widespread and systematic practices, the "where else" question is a
legitimate law enforcement question. However, the "where else" question
is asked in nearly every instance of FCPA scrutiny as evidenced by FCPA
resolution documents. For instance, the Magyar Telekom FCPA
enforcement action focused on business conduct in Macedonia and
13. Government's Memorandum in Support of the Proposed Plea Agreements and
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A., No. 10-CR-
20906, 2011 WL 2038435 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2011).
14. PRINCIPLES OF FED. PROSECUTION OF Bus. ORGS., tit. 9, ch. 9-28.000 (U.S.
Dep't of Justice 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-
charging-guidelines.pdf.
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Montenegro, but in resolving its FCPA scrutiny, the company, in the words
of the DOJ, conducted a "thorough global internal investigation concerning
bribery and related misconduct."' 5  Likewise, the Tenaris FCPA
enforcement action focused on business conduct in Uzbekistan, but in
resolving the action the DOJ cited the company's "voluntary investigation
of the Company's business operations throughout the world."16
The "where else" question is even asked in instances of FCPA scrutiny
focused on conduct in foreign subsidiaries that comprise a meaningless
percentage of the company's overall operations. For instance, the Tyson
Foods FCPA enforcement action focused on conduct in Mexico involving a
subsidiary company that "comprised less than one percent of Tyson's
global net sales."' 7  Even though approximately eighty-five to ninety
percent of Tyson's sales were domestic, in resolving the enforcement
action, Tyson subjected all of its wholly-owned production facilities,
including those located outside of Mexico, "to rigorous FCPA reviews".
An FCPA practitioner, formerly an SEC FCPA enforcement attorney,
stated as follows regarding the "where else" question:
[Q:] What percentage of FCPA enforcement actions that you have been
involved in have resulted in the 'where else' question being asked?
[A:] In my time as a regulator at the Securities and Exchange
Commission's Division of Enforcement and in private practice, the
'where else' question has been asked in virtually every single FCPA
matter in which I have been involved. I have asked it and it has been
asked of me.
[Q:] Do you believe the 'where else' question was appropriate in these
instances?
[A:] In some instances it was entirely appropriate for the SEC, the DOJ,
and other regulators to ask the 'where else' question. In others, however,
the allegations did not support a 'where else' question and it appeared to
be more of a fishing expedition and boiler plate question than a well-
reasoned question under the facts. 'Where else' is a reasonable and
appropriate question when the alleged misconduct appears to be systemic
and/or the company under investigation appears to lack the controls
necessary to prevent the payment of bribes to foreign government
officials. It is not, however, an appropriate question where it is intended
to force companies to conduct multi country internal investigations with
15. Mike Koehler, A Q&A with Claudius Sokenu on "Where Else", FCPA
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little more than the uninformed hunch of a government official who has
little or no experience in how businesses work around the world.19
That the "where else" question is asked in the absence of any meaningful
check or judicial oversight raises a host of problematic issues. Moreover,
while the purpose of this Section is to demonstrate the fact that pre-
enforcement action professional fees and expenses are typically the most
expensive aspect of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement, it must nevertheless
be highlighted that FCPA attorneys to whom the "where else" question is
posed have little incentive to pushback as the question often leads to multi-
year, multi-country billing bonanzas. As Forbes noted in an article titled
"The Bribery Racket:"
"A company that suspects bribery overseas hires a battery of lawyers,
accountants and investigators who may then report any findings to
Justice in hopes of some undefined leniency. More likely, the company
pays out huge fines and then hires more lawyers as government-
mandated compliance monitors, a job that can stretch into years of legal
billing." 20
The Wall Street Journal has observed:
"[The FCPA] has become big business for the lawyers who delve into
the operations of companies in response to an investigation by the Justice
Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission-or to avoid
one. The result is a mini-industry of investigators and white-collar
criminal-law practices."21
Likewise, an article titled "Lawyers Need to Brake Their Bribe-Case Gravy
Train" observed:
"Lawyers need to pull the brake on their bribery-probe gravy
train. Wal-Mart Stores shelled out about $80 million last quarter
alone - some $1.25 million per working day - on an internal
corruption investigation. [ ... ] Wasteful scorched-earth legal
tactics inflate costs, while potentially ruinous U.S. penalties
make companies scared to skimp. Smarter lawyering could slow
the runaway spending. Scrutiny under the FCPA typically throws
multinationals into attorney-hiring overdrive. Having legal
eagles delve into corporate innards helps a company look
19. Id.
20. Vardi, supra note 11.




FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT RIPPLES
cooperative and thereby win leniency from the government. [ ... ]
There is a better way. A records search at a multinational's
headquarters can quickly reveal how and, generally, where and
to whom bribes are being paid, according to veterans of the
Siemens case and others. Investigations in just a few countries
can then ferret out the details of a global scheme. That's often
enough to reach a reasonable settlement with Uncle Sam. Yet
unnecessarily far-flung and costly probes persist. Not only does
the prospect of enormous fees encourage lawyers running an
investigation to engage in overkill. A company's officers also
don't want to be seen to cut corners or get in the attorneys' way.
The usual healthy corporate tendency to police costs carefully
doesn't apply. For big companies the waste may not show,
either. Even a legal bill of, say, $500 million is a drop in the
bucket for a company like Wal-Mart with revenue nearly 1,000
times that figure every year. That shouldn't, however, let lawyers
off the hook. Ethics rules require their fees to be reasonable. In
bribery cases, that standard is at risk of becoming corrupted." 22
As to sky-rocketing pre-enforcement action professional fees and
expenses, it was notable that in 2013, the DOJ's FCPA Unit Chief called
out the industry at an American Bar Association event and suggested that
FCPA counsel is often seeking to "overdo it" through a global search of
operations for FCPA issues. 2 3 He discussed a case in which a company and
its professional advisors came to a meeting with a global search plan and he
said "no, no, no, that is not what I want." 24 The FCPA Unit Chief indicated
that the lawyers and other professional advisors in the room "looked
unhappy," but that the general counsel of the company was happy.2 5
Regardless of the merits of the "where else" question in most instances,
and regardless of the necessity of many pre-enforcement action
professional fees and expenses, the take-away point from this section is the
fact that such fees and expenses are often the most expensive aspect of
FCPA scrutiny and enforcement in this new era. In fact, pre-enforcement
action professional fees and expenses have become so pronounced that a
marketplace has developed to provide insurance for such expenses.26 Such
22. Further to Wal-Mart's Pre-Enforcement Action Professional Fees and
Expenses, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/further-
to-wal-marts-pre-enforcement-action-professional-fees-and-expenses.




26. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, FCPA Insurance, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 9, 2011),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-insurance; Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA
PROFESSOR (July. 29, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-30; Mike
Koehler, A Q&A Regarding FCPA Insurance, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 10, 2012),
2014 401
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LA WREVIEW
insurance, of course, does not address the root causes of why pre-
enforcement professional fees and expenses have skyrocketed, rather it
merely seeks to capitalize on the fact that such pre-enforcement action
professional fees and expenses have skyrocketed.
B. Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts
To state the obvious, failure to comply with the FCPA can expose a
company to a criminal or civil enforcement action by the DOJ and/or
SEC.27 Because the focus of this Article is the many other ripples of FCPA
scrutiny besides an actual FCPA enforcement action, this Section does not
discuss in great detail the many legal and policy issues related to FCPA
enforcement action settlement amounts. 28 However, to best understand the
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-qa-regarding-fcpa-insurance-2.
27. There is substantial overlap between the DOJ and SEC's FCPA enforcement
programs. FCPA enforcement actions against issuers (companies - domestic and
foreign - with shares registered on a U.S. exchange or otherwise required to make
filings with the SEC) typically involve related and coordinated enforcement actions by
the DOJ for criminal FCPA violations (whether anti-bribery violations or books and
records and internal control violations) and by the SEC for civil FCPA violations
(whether anti-bribery violations or books and records and internal control violations).
The overlap, however, between the DOJ and SEC's FCPA enforcement programs is not
complete. As a general matter, the SEC has jurisdiction over issuers. In other words,
the SEC generally does not have jurisdiction over private companies or foreign
companies that are not issuers. Thus, certain FCPA enforcement actions do not have an
SEC component. As a general matter, the DOJ has criminal jurisdiction over issuers,
domestic concerns, (i.e. any business entity with a principal place of business in the
U.S. or organized under U.S. law), and non-U.S. companies and persons to the extent a
bribery scheme involved conduct "while in the territory of the U.S." In addition, the
DOJ has a higher burden of proof in a criminal prosecution. As a result, and given the
DOJ's prosecutorial discretion, certain FCPA enforcement actions may only include an
SEC component. As to the DOJ's discretion, the DOJ has stated that it "has declined to
prosecute both individuals and corporate entities in numerous cases based on the
particular facts and circumstances presented in those matters, taking into account the
available evidence." See Criminal Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT Div.,
U.S. SEC, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1, 75
(2012) [hereinafter THE GUIDANCE], available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/
fcpa-resource-guide.pdf. Based on information in the DOJ and SEC authored
Guidance, it appears that factors motivating a so-called declination include voluntary
disclosure and cooperation, effective remedial measures, and small improper payments.
Id. at 77-79. In addition, the DOJ has separately stated that it has declined prosecutions
when, among other things, a single employee, and no other employee, was involved in
the improper payments at issue; and the improper payments at issue involved minimal
funds compared to the overall business revenues. See DOJ Declines to Get Specific in
Declination Responses, FCPA PROFESSOR, (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor
.com/doj-declines-to-get-specific-in-declination-responses.
28. For instance, the composition of FCPA settlement amounts in many corporate
enforcement actions is controversial. Many FCPA enforcement actions involving both
a DOJ and SEC component include features of "double-dipping" (in which the
company pays an amount representing the benefit received from the alleged improper
payments twice - first to the DOJ and then to the SEC). See Double-Dipping, FCPA
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"three buckets" of FCPA financial exposure, it is nevertheless useful to
highlight certain facts and figures concerning actual FCPA settlement
amounts.
Table I contains the largest FCPA corporate settlement amounts in
history.
Table I - Largest FCPA Corporate Settlements 29
Company Amount Year
Siemens $800 million 2008
(DOJ- $450 million)
(SEC- $350 million)
KBR / Halliburton $579 million 2009
(DOJ- $402 million)
(SEC- $177 million)
Total $398 million 2013
(DOJ- $245 million)
(SEC- $153 million)
Alcoa $384 million 2014
(DOJ- $209 million)
(SEC- $175 million)
Snamprogetti / ENI $365 million 2010
(DOJ- $240 million)
(SEC- $125 million)
Technip $338 million 2010
(DOJ- $240 million)
(SEC- $98 million)
JGC $219 million 2011
(DOJ- $219 million)
PROFESSOR (June 4, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/double-dipping. Likewise, it
is common in FCPA enforcement actions for the SEC to seek a disgorgement amount
even in the absence of anti-bribery violations (a practice known as no-charged bribery
disgorgement). See "No-Charged Bribery Disgorgement," FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug.
22, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/no-charged-bribery-disgorgement.
29. As of February 18, 2014. http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa- 101 #q 17
4032014













Even though corporate FCPA enforcement actions in this new era have
resulted in several large settlement amounts, it would be inaccurate to
conclude from Table I that every corporate FCPA enforcement action in
this new era yields nine-figure settlement amounts. To provide a more
comprehensive view of FCPA enforcement action settlement amounts,
Tables II and III highlight all corporate FCPA settlement amounts from
2013 and 2012.












30. See DOJ Enforcement of the FCPA - Year in Review, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan.
8, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-enforcement-of-the-fcpa-year-in-review-4
[hereinafter, Year in Review - Jan. 8, 2014]; see also SEC Enforcement of the FCPA -











































31. See DOJ Enforcement of the FCPA - Year in Review, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan.
9, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-enforcement-of-the-fcpa-year-in-review-3;
see also SEC Enforcement of the FCPA - Year in Review, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 8,
2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/sec-enforcement-of-the-fcpa-year-in-review-2.
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Settlement amounts in an actual FCPA enforcement action will
obviously be specific to the unique facts and circumstances at issue.
However, it is notable that seemingly routine FCPA enforcement actions in
this new era of enforcement are being resolved for amounts that were
record-setting just a few years ago. As FCPA practitioners have rightly
observed: "an unmistakable characteristic of [2013] FCPA enforcement is
that the market rate for resolving a corporate FCPA enforcement action
Vol. 3:3406
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spiked precipitously in 2013."32
Indeed, FCPA settlement amounts have come a long way in a short
amount of time. For example, in 2007, Baker Hughes resolved the largest
FCPA enforcement action of all-time by agreeing to pay a combined $44
million in DOJ and SEC enforcement actions. 33 According to the DOJ
criminal information, the company made approximately $4.1 million in
improper payments - via an agent - in connection with the Karachaganak
Project in Kazakhstan, a "giant gas and oil field".34 The DOJ's sentencing
guidelines calculation stated that the "benefit received or to be received
[from the alleged improper conduct was] approximately $19 million."3
The SEC enforcement action against Baker Hughes was based on the
same core conduct and the SEC's release stated:
Baker Hughes paid approximately $5.2 million to two agents while
knowing that some or all of the money was intended to bribe government
officials, specifically officials of State-owned companies, in Kazakhstan.
... Baker Hughes engaged the agent and was awarded an oil services
contract in the Karachaganak oil field in Kazakhstan that generated more
than $219 million in gross revenues from 2001 through 2006.36
In addition, the SEC release stated:
* from 1998 to 2004, Baker Hughes authorized commission
payments of nearly $5.3 million to an agent (who worked in
Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan) under circumstances in
which the company failed to determine whether such payments
were, in part, to be funneled to government officials in violation
of the FCPA;
32. 2013 Year End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN 1, 3 (Jan. 6, 2014),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2013-Year-End-FCPA-
Update.pdf.
33. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Baker Hughes Subsidiary Pleads
Guilty to Bribing Kazakh Official and Agrees to Pay $11 Million Criminal Fine as Part
of Largest Combined Sanction Ever Imposed in FCPA Case (Apr. 26, 2007), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_crm 296.html; see also Press Release,
U.S. SEC, SEC Charges Baker Hughes With Foreign Bribery and with Violating 2001
Commission Cease-and-Desist Order (Apr. 26, 2007) [hereinafter SEC Press Release],
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-77.htm.
34. U.S. Attorney Charges at 4, United States v. Baker Hughes Servs. Int'l, Inc.,
No. H-07-129 (S.D. Tex. filed Apr. I1, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/baker-hughs/04-11-07bakerhughesinti-info.pdf.
35. Plea Agreement at 9, United States v. Baker Hughes Servs. Int'l, Inc., No. H-
07-129 (S.D. Tex. filed Apr. 11, 2007) available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/baker-hughs/04-ll-07bakerhughes-plea.pdf.
36. SEC Press Release, supra note 33.
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* in Indonesia, between 2000 and 2003, Baker Hughes paid
certain freight forwarders to import equipment into Indonesia
using a "door-to-door" process under circumstances in which
the company failed to adequately assure itself that such
payments were not being passed on, in part, to Indonesian
customs officials;
* in Nigeria, between at least 2001 and 2005, Baker Hughes
authorized payments to certain customs brokers to facilitate the
resolution of alleged customs deficiencies under circumstances
in which the company failed to adequately assure itself that
such payments were not being passed on, in part, to Nigerian
customs officials; and
* in Angola, from 1998 to 2003, Baker Hughes paid an agent
more than $10.3 million in commissions under circumstances in
which the company failed to adequately assure itself that such
payments were not being passed on to employees of Sonangol,
Angola's state-owned oil company, to obtain or retain business
in Angola.37
In 2013, comparatively minor FCPA enforcement actions, per the
enforcement agencies' own allegations, were resolved for amounts larger
than what was a record-setting amount just a few years ago.
For instance, the Diebold enforcement action focused primarily on
excessive travel and entertainment and DOJ allegations that company
subsidiaries provided various things of value (such as Las Vegas
sightseeing, a dance show, a Grand Canyon tour, a Universal Studios tour
and a Napa Valley tour) totaling approximately $1.75 million to alleged
Chinese and Indonesian "foreign officials" at state-owned banks over a five
year period. 38 As to the core conduct, the DOJ's sentencing guidelines
calculation referenced a "value of benefit received [from the alleged
improper conduct] of more than $7 million." 39
The SEC enforcement action against Diebold was based on the same
core conduct and alleged that company subsidiaries in China and Indonesia
spent approximately $1.8 million on travel, entertainment, and other
37. Id.
38. Information, United States v. Diebold, Inc., No. 5:13CR464 (N.D. Ohio filed
Oct. 22, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
diebold/information.pdf. The enforcement action also contained non-specific monetary
allegations concerning relationships with private business customers in Russia.
However, the DOJ's sentencing guidelines calculation makes clear that the Russia
conduct was a minor factor in determining the fine and penalty amount. See Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Diebold, Inc., No. 5:13CR464 (N.D. Ohio
filed Oct. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Diebold DPA], available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/diebold/combineddpa.pdf
39. Diebold DPA, supra note 38.
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improper gifts for senior officials with the ability to influence the alleged
state-owned bank purchasing decisions.40
Thus, per the enforcement agencies' own allegations, the Diebold
enforcement action involved significantly less egregious conduct than the
Baker Hughes enforcement action. Yet, the combined $48 million
settlement amount in the Diebold was more than the record-setting $44
41million Baker Hughes enforcement action from just a few years ago.
The $32 million DOJ enforcement action against German engineering
company Bilfinger S.E. is another instructive example from 2013 that
demonstrates how FCPA settlement amounts have come a long way in a
short amount of time. The DOJ criminal information alleged, in pertinent
part, that Bilfinger conspired with others to obtain and retain contracts
related to the Eastern Gas Gathering System (EGGS) project in Nigeria
through the promise and payment of over $6 million in bribes to various
alleged Nigerian officials.4 2 As noted in the DOJ's release, the
enforcement action was directly related to a prior 2008 FCPA enforcement
against Willbros Group, Bilfinger's joint venture partner in connection with
the same EGGS project.43
The DOJ's DPA in the previous Willbros enforcement action did not set
forth a detailed advisory Sentencing Guidelines calculation as is the norm
in most current FCPA DPAs including the Bilfinger DPA. Nevertheless,
the DOJ settlement amount in the Willbros action was $22 million.44 This
$22 million settlement amount was in connection with not only the EGGS
project, but also DOJ allegations that "certain Willbros employees based in
South America agreed to make approximately $300,000 in corrupt
40. Complaint at 2, U.S. SEC v. Diebold, Inc., (D.D.C. filed Oct. 22, 2013),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2013/comp-pr2013-225.pdf.
(alleging further that Diebold falsified books and records to hide approximately $1.2
million of bribes paid to employees at privately owned banks in Russia).
41. Of course, factors beyond the core conduct at issue - such as voluntary
disclosure, cooperation and a company's past history - can influence settlement
amounts in an FCPA enforcement action. However, the Baker Hughes and Diebold
enforcement actions were substantively identical in these regards (i.e. both companies
had a past history, both companies voluntarily disclosed and both companies
cooperated).
42. Information, United States v. Bilfinger SE., (S.D. Tex. filed Dec. 9, 2013),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bilfinger/bilfinger-
information.pdf.
43. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, German Engineering Firm Bilfinger
Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges and Agrees to Pay $32 Million
Criminal Penalty (Dec. 11, 2013) available at http://www.justice.gov/opal
pr/2013/December/13-crm-1297.html.
44. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 9, United States v. Willbros Group, Inc.,




payments to Ecuadoran government officials of the state-owned oil
company PetroEcuador and its subsidiary, PetroComercial, to assist in
obtaining a gas pipeline project."45
In short, the Bilfinger enforcement action involved the same EGGS
project at issue in the Willbros enforcement. Moreover, the Willbros
enforcement action was broader in scope than the Bilfinger action as it
involved alleged corrupt payments in connection with other projects in
other countries. Yet, the 2013 Bilfinger enforcement action was resolved
for $32 million whereas the 2008 Willbros enforcement action was
resolved for $22 million. The key difference between the two enforcement
actions seems to be merely the passage of time.
C. Post-Enforcement Action Professional Fees and Expenses
The financial exposure of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement often
continues even after enforcement action day and this Section discusses the
"third bucket" of FCPA financial exposure, post-enforcement action
professional fees and expenses.
Nearly all corporate FCPA enforcement actions in this new era are
resolved via NPAs or DPAs.4 6 A common clause in such agreements is a
requirement that the company report to the enforcement agencies during
the usual 2-3 year term of the agreement regarding, among other things, its
implementation of a FCPA compliance program and its on-going
compliance efforts.4 7 While such a requirement may seem simple and
straight-forward, it often involves internal reviews, follow-up reviews, and
written reports that occupy FCPA Inc. participants for hundreds of hours
and often cost the company millions of dollars in post-enforcement action
professional fees and expenses.48
In addition to the above standard post-enforcement action compliance
obligations in a typical FCPA NPA or DPA, the enforcement agencies are
also often imposing "enhanced compliance obligations" on companies as a
45. U.S. Attorney Charges at 9, United States v. Willbros Group, Inc., No. H-08-
287 (S.D. Tex. filed May 14, 2008) available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/cases/willbros-group/05-14-08willbros-info.pdf.
46. See Year in Review -Jan. 8, 2014, supra note 30.
47. See, e.g., Plea Agreement Letter from U.S. Dep't of Justice to Archer Daniels
Midland Co. B-2 (Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/archer-daniels-midland/adm-npa.pdf.
48. The author coined the term "FCPA Inc" in April 2010. See Mike Koehler
Takes on FCPA Inc., CORP. CRIME REP. 15 (2010), available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/fcpainc041210.htm. While perhaps viewed by
some as a derogatory term, it is not intended to be. Rather, FCPA Inc. is a short-hand
term used to describe a vibrant, niche industry consisting of numerous market
participants including law firms, accounting firms, and compliance and consulting
firms.
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condition of settlement. For instance, healthcare company Johnson &
Johnson ("J&J") resolved an FCPA enforcement action focused on
subsidiary conduct in Greece, Poland, and Romania. The enforcement
action was resolved via a DPA and the DOJ specifically noted: "J&J had a
pre-existing compliance and ethics program that was effective and the
majority of problematic operations globally resulted from insufficient
implementation of the J&J compliance and ethics program in acquired
companies."49 The DPA contained the standard compliance obligations
found in typical FCPA DPAs, but also included "enhanced compliance
obligations" that J&J is required to abide by during the three-year term of
the DPA.s0
Even though the DPA stated that J&J, as part of the voluntary disclosure
and cooperation process, "conducted an extensive, global review of all of
its operations to determine if there were problems elsewhere," the
"enhanced compliance obligations" nevertheless require J&J to "conduct
risk assessments of markets where [the company] has government
customers and/or other anticorruption compliance risks on a staggered,
periodic basis."5 '
The DPA also required J&J to "identify no less than five operating
companies that are high risk for corruption because of their sector and
location and .. . conduct FCPA audits of those operating companies at least
once every three years." 52 As stated in the DPA, "FCPA audits of other
operating companies that pose corruption risk shall occur no less than once
every five years."
Pursuant to the DPA, "each FCPA audit shall include" the following:
(i) on-site visits by an audit team comprised of qualified auditors who
have received FCPA and anticorruption training; (ii) where appropriate,
participation in the on-site visits by personnel from the compliance and
legal functions; (iii) review of a statistically representative sample
appropriately adjusted for the risks of the market, of contracts with and
payments to individual health care providers; (iv) creation of action plans
resulting from issues identified during audits; and (v) where appropriate,
feasible, and permissible under local law, review of the books and
records of distributors which, in the view of the audit team, may present
49. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. Depuy, Inc., No. 1:11 -
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corruption risk.54
Likewise, the FCPA enforcement action against pharmaceutical
company Pfizer also required the company to adhere to "enhanced
compliance obligations" notwithstanding the following pertinent facts
alleged by the enforcement agencies:
(i) the substantial bulk of the enforcement action concerned conduct by
entities Pfizer acquired in 2003 and 2009; (ii) in the 18 months following
its 2009 acquisition of an entity giving rise to its scrutiny, Pfizer
conducted a due diligence and investigative review of the entity's
business operations and integrated Pfizer's internal controls system into
the business entities; (iii) there was no allegation or suggestion that
anyone at corporate headquarters knew of or approved the conduct at
issue; (iv) as soon as the problematic conduct came to the attention of
Pfizer's corporate headquarters, it made a timely voluntary disclosure to
the enforcement agencies; and (v) Pfizer's self-investigation was
thorough and wide-ranging.55
As to this last point, the DOJ stated: "From 2004 to the present, Pfizer,
using external counsel and forensic accountants, internal Legal,
Compliance, and Corporate Audit personnel, conducted an extensive,
global review of its operations regarding allegations of improper payments
to Government officials and government doctors[.]" 56 Likewise, the SEC
stated: "[Since 2004, Pfizer] diligently and thoroughly undertook a global
internal investigation of its operations in no less than 19 countries[.]" 5 7
According to the enforcement agencies, Pfizer also undertook early and
extensive remedial efforts and made substantial and continuing
improvements to its global anti-corruption compliance policies and
procedures. Specifically, the DOJ stated:
[S]tarting immediately in 2004, Pfizer launched extensive remedial
actions including: undertaken a comprehensive review of its compliance
program, implementing enhanced anti-corruption compliance policies
and procedures on a worldwide basis, developing global systems to
support employee compliance with the enhanced procedures, adding
54. Id.
55. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at A-4, United States v. Pfizer H.C.P. Corp.,
No. 12-CR-169 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 7, 2012), [hereinafter Pfizer DPA] available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/pfizer/2012-08-07-pfizer-dpa.pdf.
56. Id.
57. Complaint, U.S. SEC v. Pfizer, Inc., (D.D.C.), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/complaints/2012/comp-pr2O12-152-pfizer.pdf (last visited June 7, 2014).
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FCPA-specific reviews to its internal audits, performing proactive anti-
corruption compliance reviews in approximately ten markets annually,
and conducting comprehensive anti-corruption training throughout the
organization.
In other words, since learning of potential FCPA issues and for
approximately eight years thereafter, Pfizer did the right thing and when
the enforcement agencies use words like thorough, wide-ranging,
extensive, global, worldwide, diligent, comprehensive, proactive,
significant, innovative and sophisticated, there can be no reasonable doubt
about this. Yet, just as in the J&J enforcement action, the Pfizer DPA also
required the company to adhere to similar "enhanced compliance
obligations."
Similar to the above section concerning pre-enforcement action
professional fees and expenses, the purpose of this Section is to
demonstrate the fact that the financial consequences of FCPA scrutiny and
enforcement often continue even after enforcement action day. Yet, just as
in the previous Section, it must nevertheless be asked whether many post-
enforcement action compliance requirements are necessary or whether such
requirements imposed by government enforcement agencies in the absence
of meaningful checks or judicial oversight turn into boondoggles as well.
For instance, given the enforcement agencies' allegations and findings as
to J&J and Pfizer, were the "enhanced compliance obligations" truly
necessary? After all, in the J&J action, the DOJ concluded that the
company already had generally "effective" compliance policies and
procedures and that prior to resolving the enforcement action, J&J had
already "conducted an extensive, global review of all of its operations to
determine if there were problems elsewhere[.]" 5 9
Or were the "enhanced compliance obligations" in the J&J and Pfizer
enforcement actions examples of companies being required by the
government (under risk of prosecution for failure to do so) to engage in
fishing expeditions when the company had already gone fishing just for the
sake of going fishing again? If so, they represent a boundless and
unconstrained government-required transfer of shareholder wealth to FCPA
Inc. Such fishing expeditions are of course lucrative for FCPA Inc. hence
one reason not many in the industry have raised concerns about the
emerging trend of "enhanced compliance obligations."
In addition to standard post-enforcement action compliance obligations
or "enhanced compliance obligations" as a condition of resolving a
corporate FCPA enforcement action, certain companies have also been
58. Pfizer DPA, supra note 55.
59. Depuy DPA, supra note 49.
2014 413
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LA WREVIEW
required to engage an independent compliance monitor as a condition of
settlement. For instance, in 2013, approximately 55% of corporate DOJ
FCPA enforcement actions required the engagement of a compliance
monitor, and in 2012, approximately 35% of corporate DOJ FCPA
enforcement actions required the engagement of a monitor. 60
As noted in the DOJ/SEC FCPA Guidance issued in 2012, "a monitor is
an independent third party who assesses and monitors a company's
adherence to the compliance requirements of an agreement that was
designed to reduce the risk of recurrence of the company's misconduct."61
The term monitor is a bit misleading as it suggests a single person. The
reality is that a monitor is more like the conductor of a large orchestra and a
monitorship can become an expensive and distracting requirement of
resolving an FCPA enforcement action.
FCPA practitioners have rightly observed:
Few penalties imposed on a corporate criminal offender cause as much
consternation as do compliance monitors. After the late-night crisis
management meetings, after the invasive and expensive internal
investigation, after the shakeup of senior managers, and after the
protracted negotiations with federal authorities, companies just want to
get back to business. They want to sell their goods and services, be
profitable, invest, and grow. In short, they want to move on.
Fundamentally, the corporate compliance monitor stands in the way of
forgetting the past and going back to 'business as usual'-at least when
it comes to obeying the law. The monitor's purpose is to see that the
company follows applicable laws and regulations going forward and
institutes the proper policies and procedures to help ensure compliance.
Corporations will never welcome this 'tail' to their criminal
prosecutions. Monitorships inevitably involve significant expenditures of
funds and time. 62
According to the FCPA Guidance, the enforcement agencies consider the
following factors when determining whether a compliance monitor is an
appropriate requirement of a corporate FCPA enforcement action:
seriousness of the offense; duration of the misconduct; pervasiveness of the
misconduct, including whether the conduct cuts across geographic and/or
product lines; nature and size of the company; quality of the company's
compliance program at the time of the misconduct; and subsequent
60. See DOJ Enforcement of the FCPA - Year in Review 4, supra note 30; see also
DOJ Enforcement of the FCPA - Year In Review 3, supra note 31.
61. THE GUIDANCE, supra note 27.
62. Joseph Warin et al., Somebody's Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How
They Can Work Better, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 321, 322 (2011).
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remediation efforts.63
Based on these factors, it was not surprising that Siemens was required
to engage a compliance monitor when resolving its FCPA enforcement
action in 2008. In resolving the largest FCPA enforcement action of all-
time, the enforcement agencies stated that "for much of its operations
across the globe, bribery was nothing less than standard operating
procedure for Siemens" and that Siemens had a "corporate culture in which
bribery was tolerated and even rewarded at the highest levels of the
company."6
In 2012, the term of Siemens' monitor ended and the DOJ determined
that Siemens satisfied its settlement obligations with respect to the monitor.
The DOJ's filing provides a rare insight into the extent of the monitor's
work and stated:
In accordance with the plea agreement, the Monitor conducted an initial
review and three subsequent reviews of Siemens's anti-corruption
compliance program, and documented the Monitor's findings and
recommendations in four annual reports [. . .]. Over the course of those
four years, the Monitor conducted on-site or remote reviews of Siemens'
activities in 20 countries; conducted limited or issue-specific reviews in
or relating to an additional 19 countries; reviewed over 51,000
documents totaling more than 973,000 pages in 11 languages; conducted
interviews of or meetings with over 2,300 Siemens employees; observed
over 180 regularly scheduled company events; and spent the equivalent
of over 3,000 auditor days conducting financial studies and testing.65
Siemens has not disclosed its post-enforcement action professional fees
and expenses, including monitor costs, but one can safely assume such fees
and expenses were in the hundreds of millions of dollars and in addition to
the approximate one billion dollars the company spent in pre-enforcement
action professional fees and expenses (bucket #1) as well as the $800
million the company agreed to pay to resolve its FCPA scrutiny (bucket
#2).66
Similar to pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses,
63. THE GUIDANCE, supra note 27.
64. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Transcript of Press Conference
Announcing Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Violations (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2008/December/08-opa- I 112.html.
65. The Work of a Monitor and Checking in on Siemens, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan.
22, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-work-of-a-monitor-and-checking-in-on-
siemens [hereinafter Work ofa Monitor].
66. See Nathan Vardi, How Federal Crackdown on Bribery Hurts Business and
Enriches Insiders, FORBES (May 06, 2010, 5:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/
2010/0524/business-weatherford-kbr-corruption-bribery-racket.html.
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comparing post-enforcement action professional fees and expenses to
settlement amounts is not possible in all cases as companies have different
disclosure requirements and practices. However, where a comparison is
possible, it is clear that post-enforcement action professional fees and
expenses increase the overall financial consequences of FCPA scrutiny and
enforcement as monitor costs can reach into the millions of dollars even in
less high-profile FCPA enforcement actions.
For instance and as previously noted, oil and gas services company
Willbros Group agreed to pay approximately $32 million in combined fines
and penalties to resolve parallel DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement actions.
Pursuant to the DPA, the company was required to engage a compliance
monitor and the company disclosed total monitor expenses of
approximately $10 million. 67 Likewise, Faro Technologies agreed to pay
approximately $3 million in combined fines and penalties to resolve
parallel DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement concerning conduct in China.
Pursuant to the DPA, the company was required to engage a compliance
monitor and the company disclosed monitor expenses of $1 million in just
one quarter.6 In short, the financial consequences of FCPA scrutiny and
enforcement continue even after enforcement action day.
Regardless of which of the "three buckets" the money falls into, and
regardless of the legitimacy and necessity of many of the professional fees
and expenses discussed in this Section, the take-away point from Part I of
this Article is understanding that the fines and penalties assessed in an
actual FCPA enforcement action are often just the tip of the iceberg in
terms of a company's overall financial exposure.
With a proper understanding of the "three buckets" of FCPA financial
exposure, Part II of this Article further adds to the overall financial
consequences that can result from FCPA scrutiny or enforcement by
highlighting the many other negative business effects of FCPA scrutiny and
enforcement.
II. THE BUSINESS EFFECTS OF FCPA SCRUTINY AND ENFORCEMENT
This Part uses various case studies and examples to demonstrate how
FCPA scrutiny and enforcement can further negatively impact a company's
business operations and strategy in a variety of ways from: market
capitalization; to cost of capital; to merger and acquisition activity; to
impeding or distracting a company from achieving other business
objectives; to private shareholder litigation; to offensive use of the FCPA to
67. Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor
.com/friday-roundup-37.
68. Faro's Monitor - Late and Expensive, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 27, 2010),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/faros-monitor-late-and-expensive.
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achieve a business objective or to further advance a litigating position.
By examining the FCPA's many other ripples, this section shifts the
FCPA conversation away from a purely legal issue to its more proper
designation as a general business issue that needs to be on the radar screen
of business managers operating in the global marketplace. By highlighting
the many ripples of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement, it is hoped that more
business managers can view the importance of FCPA compliance more
holistically and not merely through the narrow lens of actual enforcement
actions.
A. Market Capitalization
Market capitalization refers to the total market value of a public
company's outstanding shares and is calculated by multiplying a
company's shares by the current market price of one share. Market
capitalization is an important data point for investors and an important
metric by which business manager performance is judged. Because FCPA
scrutiny or an enforcement action can impact a company's share price, a
company's market capitalization can likewise be impacted by the scrutiny.
Two examples of FCPA scrutiny - one involving a large well-known
company and the other involving a small lesser-known company -
highlight this issue.
Wal-Mart's previously discussed FCPA scrutiny was front-page news in
2012 when the New York Times published an article concerning alleged
conduct in Mexico.69 Even though Wal-Mart disclosed its FCPA scrutiny
in a 2011 SEC filing, the market reacted swiftly to the Times article. On
the last trading day before the Times article, Wal-Mart's stock closed at
$62.45. The first trading day after the Times article, the stock dropped 4.7
percent and continued a downward trend for several days eclipsing
approximately $20 billion in shareholder value.7 0 Investors were likely
spooked by the intense media coverage and likely became paranoid by
comments that Wal-Mart could face approximately $13 billion in ultimate
fines and penalties as a result of its FCPA scrutiny. 71 Such comments, of
course, were widely speculative and entirely off base as the largest FCPA
settlement in history is the $800 million action against Siemens.
69. See David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After
Top Level Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/
business/at-wal-mart-in-mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html?_r-2&hp&.
70. Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement as Seen Through
Wal-Mart's Potential Exposure, 7 WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. no. 19, 2012, available
at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2 145678.
71. Eric Platt, How a Walmart Bribery Fine Could Spiral Up over $13 Billion,
BusINESS INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2012 2:42 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-
walmarts-fine-could-spiral-up-to- 144-billion-2012-4.
2014 417
AMERICAN UNiVERSITY BUSINESS LA wREVIEW
In 2010, shares of SciClone Pharmaceuticals Inc. (a U.S.-based, China-
focused specialty pharmaceutical company) were likewise impacted by the
company's FCPA scrutiny as the company's shares plunged approximately
40% and closed down approximately 32% from its previous trading day.72
Such a dramatic decline in a company's stock price is normally associated
with a Chief Executive Officer resigning, a declaration of bankruptcy, or
other crisis-like events. However, the decline in SciClone's stock price
was likely due to the following disclosure made by the company:
SciClone was contacted by the SEC and advised that the SEC has
initiated a formal, non-public investigation of SciClone. In connection
with this investigation, the SEC issued a subpoena to SciClone
requesting a variety of documents and other information. The subpoena
requests documents relating to a range of matters including interactions
with regulators and government-owned entities in China, activities
relating to sales in China and documents relating to certain company
financial and other disclosures. The Company [also] received a letter
from the DOJ indicating that the DOJ was investigating FCPA issues in
the pharmaceutical industry generally, and had received information
about the Company's practices suggesting possible violations. 73
The dramatic decline in SciClone's share price was thus merely based on
disclosure that the company had received an SEC subpoena and a letter of
inquiry from the DOJ as part of an industry-wide investigation of the
pharmaceutical industry.
A company's stock price, and thus its market capitalization, can also be
negatively impacted by investment analyst downgrades due to FCPA
scrutiny. For instance, the shares of technology company NCR Corp. fell
approximately 8% after an investment analyst downgraded the company's
stock to neutral from outperform because of the company's FCPA
scrutiny.74 Among the concerns noted in the analyst report were: a multi-
quarter investigation; potential fines and penalties from the single millions
to tens of million; much of the company's share gains over the last two
years came in emerging markets and such growth may be at risk if an
72. Update 1-SciClone Shares Plunge on SEC, DOJ Probe, REUTERS
(Aug. 10, 2010, 12:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/10/sciclone-idUSS
GE6790K320100810.
73. SciClone Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 16, 2010),
available at http://investor.sciclone.com/secfiling.cfm?filinglD= 1193125-10-58363.
74. Notable Calls, NCR Corp (NCR): Downgraded as Potential FCPA Issues Add
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FCPA investigation restricts current business practices; and that companies
uninhibited by the FCPA, such as China-based competitors, could gain
market share.75
Whether FCPA scrutiny will impact a company's market capitalization
often depends on the nature of the company (for instance, SciClone is a
China-focused pharmaceutical company with a substantial portion of its
revenue tied to that country making FCPA scrutiny in China a significant
event) or the means by which the FCPA scrutiny is communicated (such as
a front-page article in the Times about Wal-Mart).
Indeed, investor reaction to FCPA scrutiny or enforcement is not often as
dramatic as the above examples suggest. For instance, a Wall Street
Journal analysis sought to measure market reaction to an FCPA
investigation by asking "whether and to what extent shareholders trade on
the announcements of FCPA investigations (internal or government) and
settlements."76 The analysis, based on more than 40 corporate cases since
2004, found "a lot of shrugging on the part of investors" and that "the
average change in stock price from the day before to the day after the
disclosure of an FCPA investigation was a decrease of 1%."n7 An analysis
by Nera Economic Consulting drew a similar conclusion. Using a market
model analysis that measured the relationship between stock price
movement of companies that resolved FCPA enforcement actions against
the S&P 500 index prior to the first apparent announcement of FCPA-
related allegations, the analysis found that "in some instances the
implication of an alleged FCPA violation is considered serious by the
market."7 However, for most companies that resolve an FCPA
enforcement action, the analysis found that "there was no statistically
significant price reaction" by the market upon apparent first announcement
of FCPA-related allegations.7 9
Even if the stock of certain companies decline upon news of FCPA
scrutiny, business managers may find comfort in the short duration of the
FCPA induced dip. For instance, even SciClone's stock soon recovered its
lost value and began trading at a higher price. Likewise, Wal-Mart's
stock soon recovered all of its value and outperformed the market after its
75. Id.
76. Joe Palazzolo, Does the FCPA Move Markets, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Oct. 2,
2012 11:12 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/10/02/does-the-fcpa-move-markets/.
77. Id.
78. Raymond Wong & Patrick Conroy, FCPA Settlements: It's a Small World After
All, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING (Jan. 28, 2009),
http://www.nera.com/extImage/PubFCPASettlements_0109_Final2.pdf.
79. Id.
80. See The Silver Lining, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 7, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-silver-lining.
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FCPA-induced dip.8'
These examples suggest that FCPA-induced dips in stock prices may be
the result of misinformed doomsday scenarios and not financial
fundamentals. Based upon the above studies, it appears that in most
instances of FCPA scrutiny markets care little and that investment
professionals may realize how diluted FCPA enforcement has become in
this new era. Indeed, commenting on the rapid rise in Wal-Mart's stock
price after the New York Times induced FCPA dip, a Forbes commentator
stated:
My 30 years of experience in the markets has repeatedly shown to me
that whenever a company is accused of violations of FCPA, headlines
are always scary, but in the end, the downdraft in the stock invariably
becomes a buying opportunity.82
Even if a company's FCPA-induced stock dip is short-lived and even if a
company's stock price declines on average only 1% after disclosure of
FCPA scrutiny, one business effect of FCPA enforcement, or merely the
mention of FCPA scrutiny, can be a negative impact on a company's
market capitalization.
B. Cost of Capital
FCPA scrutiny can also negatively impact a company's cost of capital,
specifically a company's credit rating. A company's credit rating matters
for a number of reasons. For instance, a company with a lower credit
rating may be faced with a smaller pool of potential investors and thus may
have to offer those investors a higher interest rate. Likewise, a company's
credit rating will determine the interest rate at which the company can
borrow money and certain institutional investors may be barred from
owning non-investment grade corporate bonds.
A report by ratings agency Fitch Ratings, titled "U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act-No Minor Matter," highlights the variety of cost of capital
effects that can arise from FCPA scrutiny or enforcement.83 The report
noted that FCPA scrutiny can have ratings implications for companies with
modest free cash flow ("FCF") and/or liquidity constraints. The report
8 1. Id.
82. Nigam Arora, Mexican Bribery Gave Me a Chance to Make Money in Wal-
Mart, FORBES (May 17, 2012 12:44 PM)), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
greatspeculations/2012/05/17/mexican-bribery-gave-me-a-chance-to-make-money-in-
wal-mart/.
83. FITCH RATINGS, U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT - No MINOR MATTER,
(2010).
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further noted "that it can take years from the discovery of a violation to the
time of a plea agreement is reached" and stated:
In the interim, corporate credit profiles, liquidity, and ratings may
weaken. The fine that could be easily paid with cash on hand today
might not be readily payable years down the road if a company's credit
profile has weakened and liquidity becomes constrained.84
As to the financial effect of "deferring the legal consequences" of
alleged FCPA violations via NPAs and DPAs, the report noted that
prosecutions declined or deferred pursuant to these agreements could be
activated if the company fails to adhere to its obligations under the
agreements, meaning "that investors and analysts cannot take a deep breath
or relax until" the time period in the NPA or DPA has expired.
The Fitch report also highlighted the significant amount of pre-
enforcement action professional fees and expenses typically incurred by
companies under FCPA scrutiny. Indeed, Avon's bond rating has been
downgraded due to "expenses related to the ongoing investigation under
the FCPA."86
Although the Fitch report noted that many FCPA fines are "imposed on
large investment grade corporations whose substantial cash balances easily
afforded them the ability to absorb the payments with no or minimal
increases in leverage," the report also noted that "there have also been
[FCPA] violations by non-investment grade companies."87 One instance
discussed in the Fitch report was the previously mentioned Willbros Group
Inc. enforcement action. It was noted that: Willbros borrowed from banks
on a secured basis; when the company became aware of its FCPA issues
the scrutiny and related issues resulted in the restatement of its annual
financial statements; and that the scrutiny required "several amendments on
its bank credit facility" which was reduced from $150 million to $100
million.88
In short, as the above examples highlight, FCPA scrutiny and
enforcement can also negatively impact a company's cost of capital and set
into motion multiple negative financial consequences.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. S&P Cuts Avon Products, Inc, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2012 2:48 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/16/idUSWNA272720120316.




C. Mergers and Acquisitions
In addition to market capitalization and cost of capital, FCPA scrutiny
and enforcement can also negatively impact merger or acquisition activity.
Such negative impacts range from terminating planned merger or
acquisition activity, to restructuring the terms and conditions of the planned
transaction, to reducing the expected financial benefits of the transaction.
1. Termination
The failed merger between aerospace company Lockheed Martin
Corporation and Titan Corporation best demonstrates this ripple of FCPA
scrutiny and enforcement. In announcing the planned acquisition,
Lockheed's Chairman and CEO stated:
Titan provides additional presence within the U.S. Government customer
base and expands our competencies. Titan is an excellent fit with
Lockheed Martin, and its acquisition is consistent with our disciplined
growth and cash deployment strategies. Titan's outstanding record of
sales growth and the quality of its workforce made this transaction very
attractive to us. This workforce, together with our highly skilled people,
allows us to provide more cost effective and robust solutions to
customers of both companies.
However, soon thereafter, Lockheed announced that it "learned of
allegations that improper payments were made, or items of value were
provided, by consultants for Titan Corporation or its subsidiaries to foreign
officials." 90 Lockheed stated:
The allegations were identified as part of a review conducted with Titan
of payments to Titan's international consultants in connection with the
proposed acquisition of Titan. The alleged payments and provision of
items of value, if true, raise questions concerning whether there has been
a violation of the FCPA. ... The review is ongoing. Titan is cooperating
with this effort, as well as conducting its own review. Lockheed Martin
and Titan have met with the SEC and the DOJ to discuss the allegations
of improper payments. . . . Closing of the Titan transaction is subject to
approval of Titan's stockholders, the absence of any material adverse
change in Titan and other conditions set forth in the merger agreement.
... Lockheed Martin will need to determine whether the conditions to
89. Press Release, U.S. SEC, Lockheed Martin Announces Agreement to Acquire
Titan Corporation (Sept. 15, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/936468/000119312503050218/dex99 1.htm.
90. Press Release, U.S. SEC, Titan Updates Status of Review of International
Consultants (Mar. 5, 2004), available at http://www,sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/31158/000119312504065745/d425.htm.
422 Vol. 3:3
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES A CT RIPPLES
the merger have been satisfied. 91
Titan's FCPA scrutiny, which Lockheed could have inherited upon
completion of the merger, resulted in a delay of the shareholder vote to
approve the merger as well as an amended merger agreement extending the
time period for the merger to occur. The amended merger agreement
provided that "as a condition to the closing of the transaction, Titan must
obtain written confirmation that the DOJ considers its investigation of these
allegations resolved and does not intend to pursue any claims against Titan,
or Titan must have entered into a plea agreement with the DOJ and
completed the sentencing process."92
Ultimately, Titan's unresolved FCPA scrutiny caused Lockheed to
abandon the merger because Titan "did not satisfy all the closing
conditions." 93 Lockheed stated:
Under the terms of the amended merger agreement, either party could
terminate the merger agreement if Titan either (i) had not obtained
written confirmation from the DOJ that the investigation of alleged
FCPA violations was resolved as to Titan and the Department did not
intend to pursue any claims against Titan; or (ii) Titan had not entered
into a plea agreement [by a certain date] ... Titan did not satisfy either
requirement. ... The corporation declined Titan's request for a further
extension.94
In announcing termination of the merger, a Lockheed spokesperson said
that the company "made every possible effort to make this happen, but it
just reached a point where we didn't want the uncertainty surrounding this
to continue indefinitely."95
Termination of the merger had several adverse consequences for Titan as
well. In addition to losing an acquirer, news of the merger termination
caused Titan's shares to fall by approximately 20% and investment analysts
downgraded the company's stock.9 6 Titan's FCPA scrutiny, of course, did
not disappear and the company ultimately plead guilty to FCPA charges
for, among other things, making payments through an agent of more than
9 1. Id.
92. Id.
93. Press Release, U.S. SEC Lockheed Martin Terminates Merger Agreement with
the Titan Corporation (June 26, 2004).
94. Id.
95. Lockheed Drops Titan Merger After Delays by Bribery Probe, L.A. TIMES,
June 27, 2004, http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jun/27/nation/na-titan27.
96. Id.
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$2 million to the election campaign of Benin's then-incumbent president.
In resolving its FCPA scrutiny, Titan agreed to pay approximately $28
million in combined fine and penalty amounts, the largest FCPA settlement
in history at the time.97
Termination of the Lockheed - Titan merger has lessons for both an
acquiring company and a target company. For an acquiring company,
FCPA-related due diligence of a target company should be part of the
merger due diligence agenda so that potential FCPA issues can be learned
in advance of closing. For a target company, implementing proactive
FCPA compliance policies and procedures to minimize risk can increase
the value of the company and its attractiveness to a potential acquiring
company.
Not all instances of FCPA scrutiny have as severe an effect on merger
activity as in the Lockheed - Titan example. However, as demonstrated by
the below examples, FCPA scrutiny and enforcement actions can also
result in restructuring of the terms and conditions of planned transactions
and reduce the expected financial benefits of the transaction.
2. Restructuring
An instructive case study for how FCPA scrutiny can significantly
impact the terms and conditions of a planned merger involved engineering
companies PBSJ Corporation and WS Atkins. In 2010, PBSJ disclosed an
FCPA internal investigation in connection with certain projects undertaken
by its subsidiary. 98 A few months later, PBSJ disclosed that its "Audit
Committee completed the internal investigation [and] [t]he results of that
investigation suggest that FCPA violations may have occurred." 99
Shortly thereafter, PBSJ announced that it had entered into a definitive
merger agreement in which WS Atkins planned to acquire PBSJ in an all-
cash transaction. Proxy materials filed by PBSJ in connection with the
merger provided an informative insight into how the FCPA issues impacted
the terms and conditions by which PBSJ would attempt to sell itself.
Among other things, the proxy materials highlighted the actions of
interested purchasers of PBSJ including: holding meetings with PBSJ's
outside counsel and its in-house counsel to discuss the FCPA investigation;
requesting the opportunity to meet with DOJ representatives regarding the
FCPA investigation; and requesting access to attorney-client privileged
97. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Attorney S. Dist. of Cal. (Mar. 1, 2005),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/titan-corp/03-01-05titan-
pr-plea.pdf.
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documents regarding the FCPA investigation. 00
In the end, PBSJ's board approved a merger agreement with Atkins even
though PBSJ had received a higher offer from another company. However,
the other company sought more stringent closing conditions regarding
PBSJ's FCPA scrutiny. In approving Atkin's bid, the PBSJ proxy
materials stated:
Positive factors considered by the [PBSJ] board of directors included: ...
the terms of the merger agreement and the related agreements, including:
the limited number and nature of the conditions to Atkins' obligation to
consummate the merger, including its willingness not to impose special
conditions related to our previously disclosed FCPA investigation beyond
those developments that would independently constitute a material adverse
effect. 0'
3. Reduced Financial Benefits
FCPA scrutiny or an enforcement action can also reduce the full
financial benefits expected from a merger by imposing significant post-
closing expenses on the acquiring company for the target company's pre-
closing FCPA scrutiny.
For instance, facilities services company ABM Industries Inc. disclosed:
[The] Company [has] began an internal investigation into matters
relating to compliance with the FCPA and the Company's internal
policies in connection with services provided by a foreign entity
affiliated with a Linc joint venture partner. Such services commenced
prior to the Company's acquisition of Linc. As a result of the
investigation, the Company has caused Line to terminate its association
with the arrangement. The Company [has] contacted the DOJ and the
SEC to voluntarily disclose the results of its internal investigation to
date. The Company cannot reasonably estimate the potential liability, if
any, related to these matters. 102
As indicated by the disclosure, ABM's FCPA scrutiny does not involve
anything it did. Rather, ABM's scrutiny is based on a foreign entity
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. ABM Industries Discloses Merger Related Issue, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 26,
2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/abm-industries-discloses-merger-related-issue
(containing links to original source documents).
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affiliated with a joint venture partner of a company ABM acquired. The
value of the merger was approximately $300 million and it is already being
reduced by the acquired company's FCPA scrutiny as ABM has spent
approximately $6.2 million in pre-enforcement action professional fees and
expenses.103 Factoring in ABM's potential exposure based on an actual
FCPA enforcement action, 5% of the merger value could easily evaporate
due to the acquired company's FCPA scrutiny.
In addition, post-enforcement action professional fees and expenses can
further reduce the expected financial benefits of a merger. For instance,
Alliance One International resolved an FCPA enforcement action by
agreeing to pay $19.5 million in combined fines and penalties.'0 4 The
entire enforcement action was based on the pre-merger conduct of acquired
entities and pursuant to the NPA Alliance One was required to engage a
compliance monitor for three years. Two years into the NPA, Alliance One
has disclosed approximately $10 million in post-enforcement action
monitoring costs.105
D. Lost or Delayed Opportunities
FCPA scrutiny or enforcement can also result in several other wide-
ranging negative business effects such as lost or delayed opportunities.
For instance, for several years Swiss logistics company Panalpina was
under FCPA scrutiny for business conduct in Nigeria and in 2010 the
company agreed to pay approximately $82 million to resolve DOJ and SEC
enforcement actions.' 06
In the midst of this scrutiny, during the company's annual meeting a
shareholder demanded that someone "step up and take responsibility" for
the company's poor performance.'0 7 In response, Panalpina's CEO stated,
among other things, that "it is not easy being under investigation for two
years, and [the FCPA investigation] is not making the situation any
103. ABM Industries, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 18, 2013); ABM
Industries, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 20, 2012).
104. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, E District of Va., Alliance One
International Inc. and Universal Corporation Resolve Related FCPA Matters Involving
Bribes Paid to Foreign Government Officials (Jan. 1, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2010/08/20100806allianceonenr.html.
105. FCPA Issues Can Reduce the Value of a Merger, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 14,
2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-issues-can-reduce-the-value-of-a-merger.
106. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight
Forwarding Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay
More Than $156 Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1251.html.
107. "It's Not Easy Being Under Investigation for Two Years ... ," FCPA PROFESSOR




easier."' 08 The company's Chief Operating Officer added:
You can say the whole FCPA and Nigeria situation reflects badly on the
management, but the fact is that as long as we are still involved in the
investigation we will continue to lose market share, because our
customers have internal regulations which prevent them from doing
business with companies which are under investigation by the DOJ. As
soon as this investigation is over, we will win some of this business
back. Customers have told us 'as soon as you have settled the FCPA, we
will do business with you again.' 109
The lost business opportunities that can flow from FCPA scrutiny is
perhaps best demonstrated by JPMorgan's FCPA scrutiny. In August
2013, the New York Times reported that "[flederal authorities have opened
a bribery investigation into whether JPMorgan Chase hired the children of
powerful Chinese officials to help the bank win lucrative business.""t0 The
Times article stated:
In one instance, the bank hired the son of a former Chinese banking
regulator who is now the chairman of the China Everbright Group, a
state-controlled financial conglomerate ... After the chairman's son
came on board, JPMorgan secured multiple coveted assignments from
the Chinese conglomerate, including advising a subsidiary of the
company on a stock offering, records show. The Hong Kong office of
JPMorgan also hired the daughter of a Chinese railway official. That
official was later detained on accusations of doling out government
contracts in exchange for cash bribes, the government document and
public records show. The former official's daughter came to JPMorgan
at an opportune time for the New York-based bank: The China Railway
Group, a state-controlled construction company that builds railways for
the Chinese government, was in the process of selecting JPMorgan to
advise on its plans to become a public company, a common move in
China for businesses affiliated with the government.I'
There have been FCPA enforcement actions that have included
allegations regarding the hiring of children or spouses of alleged "foreign
officials,""12 and the Times article caused JPMorgan, and other companies
108. Id.
109. Id.
I10. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Ben Protess & David Barboza, Hiring in China by
JPMorgan Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 17, 2013,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/hiring-in-china-by-jpmorgan-under-scrutiny/.
I 11. Id.
112. JPMorgan's Hiring Practices in China Under Scrutiny, FCPA PROFESSOR
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in the financial sector, to conduct internal reviews of hiring practices in
China and elsewhere.
As a result of JPMorgan's FCPA scrutiny, the company has withdrawn
from several lucrative financial deals. For instance, it was reported by the
Wall Street Journal that JPMorgan "has withdrawn from underwriting
midtier lender China Everbright Bank Co.'s $2 billion initial public
offering in Hong Kong." 1l3 The reason given was that since its FCPA
scrutiny surfaced, "deals have faced intense scrutiny from the U.S. bank's
compliance division."'14  Similarly, it was soon thereafter reported that
JPMorgan "has pulled out of a $1 billion initial public offering of a Chinese
chemical company and won't seek a role in the IPO of a Chinese state-
owned train maker, as the bank walks away from deals that could come
under scrutiny from U.S. investigators probing its hiring practices in
China.""'
Investment bank IPO fees are typically 1.5% to 3% of the deal's size and
JPMorgan's FCPA scrutiny has thus already caused it, mere months after
its scrutiny arose, to withdraw from, or not pursue, business opportunities
in excess of $100 million." 6  This lost business, along with pre-
enforcement action professional fees and expenses, is likely to be the
greatest financial consequence of JPMorgan's FCPA scrutiny.
FCPA scrutiny can also delay company growth and make general
business conditions more difficult as further demonstrated by Wal-Mart's
scrutiny. According to the Wall Street Journal, three years ago Wal-Mart
set out to be India's top retailer by 2015. However, the article noted that
"Wal-Mart's advance on India is barely moving" and one of the "biggest
reasons has been a compliance crackdown at Wal-Mart" following its
FCPA scrutiny." 7 The article stated that "developing and operating stores
in India is complicated, even for locals" because "dozens of permits and
licenses are required from various agencies down to the municipal level.""
(Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/jpmorgans-hiring-practices-in-china-
under-scrutiny.
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In response to its FCPA scrutiny, the article noted that Wal-Mart has
"enlisted a phalanx of lawyers from a U.S. firm to develop compliance
procedures and train employees in India," and that "the company also has
begun requiring its Indian landlords to attest that they haven't greased any
government palms."' 19 In short, "[r]unning people through those hoops has
slowed" Wal-Mart's expansion plans in India.' 2 0
E. Other Effects
FCPA scrutiny can also be distracting for company management forced
to focus on FCPA issues instead of other core business issues. For
instance, Wal-Mart has disclosed that its FCPA issues "may require the
involvement of certain members of the Company's senior management that
could impinge on the time they have available to devote to other matters
relating to the business."' 2 1 In addition, Wal-Mart disclosed that its FCPA
investigation "resulted in a significant increase in the workload" of its
Audit Committee members and during 2014 the Audit Committee
"conducted 13 additional meetings related to the investigation and
compliance matters. . .
Another instructive example involved gas detection company RAE
Systems. As previously highlighted, the company resolved related DOJ
and SEC enforcement actions by agreeing to pay a combined $2.95 million
in settlement amounts. In a revealing interview, the CFO at the time of the
investigation and enforcement action discussed how the company's FCPA
scrutiny came to derail his other job duties and caused him to have a falling
out with the company's CEO.123
FCPA scrutiny can also negatively impact an executive's compensation.
For instance, in the midst of Diebold's FCPA scrutiny the company's
Compensation Committee reduced the cash bonus of the President and
CEO concluding that "given the CEO's ultimate responsibility for the
oversight of the company, as a result of the impact to the company of the
global FCPA investigation it was appropriate that [his] cash bonus be
reduced." 2 4
Whether it's a negative impact on market capitalization or cost of
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Scrutiny Alerts and Updates, FCPA PROFESSOR (April 3, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/scrutiny-alerts-and-updates.
122. Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor
.com/friday-roundup-1 18.
123. The Former CFO of RAE Systems Speaks, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 14, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-former-cfo-of-rae-systems-speaks.




capital, a variety of negative effects on merger and acquisition activity,
causing a company to lose or delay business opportunities, or impeding or
distracting a company from achieving other business objectives, as
highlighted in this Section, FCPA scrutiny and enforcement can negatively
impact a business in a variety of ways separate and distinct from any actual
enforcement action.
Because of these many ripples of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement,
FCPA compliance needs to be on the radar screen of business managers
operating in the global marketplace. By highlighting the many ripples of
FCPA scrutiny and enforcement, the FCPA conversation should shift away
from a purely legal issue to its more proper designation as a general
business issue and more business managers should view the importance of
FCPA compliance more holistically and not merely through the narrow
lens of actual enforcement actions.
Indeed, the business effects of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement in this
new era have become so pronounced that FCPA and associated risks have
come to be included in the generic risks (such as loss of key personnel,
global economic conditions, and currency fluctuations) companies disclose
to investors as required in most SEC filings. The annual report of
manufacturer Gardner Denver, Inc. provides a representative example. In
its annual report filed with the SEC, the company disclosed, among other
risk factors, the following:
The risk of non-compliance with U.S. and foreign laws and regulations
applicable to our international operations could have a significant impact
on our results of operations, financial condition or strategic objectives.
Our global operations subject us to regulation by U.S. federal and state
laws and multiple foreign laws, regulations and policies, which could
result in conflicting legal requirements. These laws and regulations are
complex, change frequently, have tended to become more stringent over
time and increase our cost of doing business. These laws and regulations
include ... anti-corruption and bribery laws such as the [FCPA] ... and
local laws prohibiting corrupt payments to government officials. We are
subject to the risk that we, our employees, our affiliated entities,
contractors, agents or their respective officers, directors, employees and
agents may take actions determined to be in violation of any of these
laws, particularly as we expand our operations geographically through
organic growth and acquisitions. An actual or alleged violation could
result in substantial fines, sanctions, civil or criminal penalties,
debarment from government contracts, curtailment of operations in
certain jurisdictions, competitive or reputational harm, litigation or
regulatory action and other consequences that might adversely affect our
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results of operations, financial condition or strategic objectives. 125
Regardless of the FCPA's many ripples, business managers can at least
find solace in the following: while FCPA scrutiny and enforcement does
indeed have several direct and indirect negative effects on a company and
is distracting to management, there is often a silver lining that results from
FCPA scrutiny or enforcement.
Business managers involved in an FCPA investigation often learn
detailed information about a variety of meaningful corporate issues
including: the company's business in foreign countries; how the company
operates in foreign countries; the personnel who run the business units and
make the key decisions in foreign countries; and whether the company has
effective internal controls.
During the stress and strain of FCPA scrutiny, company management
(assuming they themselves are not culpable) often grow closer and develop
a deeper trust of each other. In addition, the company's commitment to
FCPA compliance (and compliance in general) often grows stronger.
Given the motivation to improve, a company may try new things, such as
aligning management compensation more closely to compliance metrics,
and/or rewarding employees for compliance-related achievements.
Nothing, of course, prevents company management from learning of these
issues or taking these actions in the absence of FCPA scrutiny. However,
the realities of the business world often put these proactive issues on the
backburner.
Even Wal-Mart's FCPA scrutiny, likely the most high-profile and
expensive instance of FCPA scrutiny in history, has a silver lining. For
instance, during an investor conference call the following exchange
occurred between an investment analyst and Wal-Mart's CEO.
Analyst: ". . . I'm going to step into the FCPA issue, if I can . .. I think
the investment community's already voted that it's not really an issue
from our standpoint, in terms of financial issues, but it's obviously a big
one reputationally and a big one that you had to deal with from a
standpoint of the media and all of that ... Which really, we think, are
probably unfair because of a lot of good things that Wal-Mart has been
involved in over the last decade and continues to be involved in. How do
you use this opportunity? How do you think about it? I know [Wal-Mart
executive vice president, general counsel] has got to think about it from
protecting the Company and that's what that outside investigation is. But
[CEO], you have to think about it from a standpoint of transparency, and
how do you lift this up and then show the entire world how you handle
125. Gardner Denver, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2013).
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this situation and crisis, which has come to the Company and not at your
desire, but from just those events that have transpired?
CEO: "One thing that's clear is that we will be a better company because
of this. Sometimes when there's a situation, like this, you can treat it as a
challenge or create an opportunity. And frankly, you can see we're
already taking this as an opportunity to be a better company. And so
even the focus on doing business the right way, and the initiatives of
outreach to communities is something we're just going to be - you
might say just doubling the efforts to be a better company in everything
that we do. And frankly, I think it will just lead to long-term being a
better company serving communities and serving customers. So yes, a
short-term challenge; long-term, it creates us a greater opportunity to be
even better. 26
F. Shareholder Litigation
Although courts have held that the FCPA does not provide a private right
of action,12 7 plaintiffs' lawyers representing shareholders often target
directors and executive officers of companies subject to FCPA scrutiny
with civil suits alleging, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty or
securities fraud. In other words, as this Section highlights, the FCPA's
ripples can also reach individuals and not just business organizations.
Two types of FCPA-related shareholder lawsuits are discussed:
derivative claims alleging director and officer breach of fiduciary duty and
securities fraud class action claims. Before analyzing these two types of
claims, it is instructive to understand how such claims often follow a
predictable pattern. In the days and weeks following an FCPA
enforcement action, or even a company disclosing or otherwise being the
subject of FCPA scrutiny, purported investigations are launched by
plaintiffs' firms representing shareholders and lawsuits often begin to rain
down on the company, its board of directors or executive officers.
For instance, as discussed earlier in connection with market
capitalization issues, shares of SciClone Pharmaceuticals plunged
approximately 40% and closed down approximately 32% from its previous
trading day based on the company's disclosure that it had received an SEC
subpoena and a letter of inquiry from the DOJ as part of an industry-wide
FCPA investigation of the pharmaceutical industry. A feeding frenzy
followed, and on the same day, four separate plaintiffs' firms announced
investigations of SciClone on behalf of shareholders to determine whether
securities laws were violated. The next day four additional plaintiffs' firm
announced similar investigations. The following days saw numerous other
126. The Silver Lining, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 7, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor
.com/the-silver-lining.
127. Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1029 (6th Cir. 1990).
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investigations and within three days of the disclosure, the first securities
class action lawsuit was filed on behalf of certain SciClone shareholders.
The plaintiffs' lawyers stated:
The Complaint alleges that throughout the Class Period, defendants were
engaged in illegal and improper sales and marketing activities in China
and abroad regarding its products. This ultimately caused the Company
to become the focus of a joint investigation by the [SEC and DOJ] for
possible violations of the [FCPA]. It was only at the end of the Class
Period, however, that investors ultimately learned the truth about the
Company's operations after it was reported that the SEC and DOJ were
investigating the Company for violations of the FCPA. At that time,
shares of the Company declined almost 40% in the single trading day, on
abnormally large trading volume.128
In the following days and weeks, numerous other plaintiffs' firms
announced investigations and/or filed lawsuits against the company, its
board of directors or executive officers. 129
A similar feeding frenzy also followed the New York Times article
regarding Wal-Mart's alleged conduct in Mexico. Within 48 hours, several
plaintiffs' firms announced investigations on behalf of shareholders and
within ten days shareholder civil suits tracking the Times article began to
pour in against the company and its directors and executive officers.
Approximately one month after the Times article, Wal-Mart disclosed:
The Company is a defendant in several recently-filed lawsuits in which
the complaints closely track the allegations set forth in a news story that
appeared in the New York Times. One of these is a securities lawsuit ...
in which the plaintiff alleges various violations of the [FCPA] beginning
in 2005, and asserts violations of [the securities laws] relating to certain
prior disclosures of the Company. . . . In addition, eleven derivative
complaints were filed . .. also tracking the allegations of the Times story,
and naming various current and former officers and directors as
additional defendants. The plaintiffs in the derivative suits . . . allege,
among other things, that the defendants who are or were directors or
officers of the Company breached their fiduciary duties in connection
128. In the Blink of an Eye ... Along Comes a Securities Fraud Suit, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/in-the-blink-of-an-eye-
along-comes-a-securities-fraud-suit.
129. See SciClone - An FCPA Feeding Frenzy, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 13, 2010),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/sciclone-an-fcpa-feeding-frenzy (listing 18 firms who
released statements concerning SciClone in the two weeks after the FCPA disclosure).
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with oversight of FCPA compliance. 130
1. Derivative Actions
The internal affairs of a corporation, such as the rights and
responsibilities of corporate directors, are governed by state law. State law,
including most prominently Delaware law, provides directors broad
discretion to manage the corporation subject to their fiduciary duties to the
corporation and its shareholders. A director's fiduciary duties include the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty, including its subsidiary component the
duty of good faith.
In a notable case in the corporate director context, a court observed:
The sentinel asleep at his post contributes nothing to the enterprise he is
charged to protect ... Shareholders have a right to expect that directors
will exercise reasonable supervision and control over the policies and
practices of a corporation. The institutional integrity of a corporation
depends upon the proper discharge by directors of those duties.
A corporate director's duty of good faith has evolved over time to
include an obligation to attempt in good faith to assure that an adequate
corporate information and reporting system exists. In the notable
Caremark decision by the influential Delaware Court of Chancery, the
court held that a director's failure to do so, in certain circumstances, may
give rise to individual director liability for breach of fiduciary duty.' 3 2
In Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court provided the following
necessary conditions for director oversight liability under the so-called
Caremark standard: (i) a director utterly failed to implement any reporting
or information system or controls; or (ii) having implemented such systems
or controls, a director failed to monitor or oversee the corporation's
operations. 33 The court held that both situations require a showing that a
director knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations and
courts have widely recognize that a director's good faith exercise of
oversight responsibility may not necessarily prevent employees from
violating criminal laws or from causing the corporation to incur significant
financial liability or both.134
Derivative claims in the FCPA context "are often based on one or more
130. Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 8, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor
.com/friday-roundup-43.
131. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822-24 (N.J. 1981).
132. In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
133. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 2006).
134. Id. (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n. 34 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
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of the following alleged actions or failures of directors and/or officers:
* participation in, concealment of, or failure to prevent the FCPA
violations;
* preparation, review, and/or signing of false and misleading public
statements;
* failure to comply with the company's code of business conduct or
similar policy requiring FCPA compliance;
* failure to require the company to implement internal controls in
compliance with the FCPA's antibribery provisions or books, records,
and internal accounting provisions;
* failure to monitor the company's compliance with, or implement
mechanisms for enforcement of, the company's anti-corruption policies
and procedures;
* failure to implement information and reporting systems to ensure senior
management and the board of directors have adequate information about
the company's business and operations, material events, and compliance;
* failure to fulfill the responsibilities and duties of membership on
committees of the company's board of directors;
* failure to remedy any illegal conduct or direct the company to institute
suit against current or former board members and officers for permitting
FCPA violations; and
* failure to oversee, manage, and operate the company in a lawful and
ethical manner."
135
A derivative claim against directors and officers of oil and gas services
company Tidewater Inc. after the company resolved an FCPA enforcement
is representative of the type of derivative claims frequently brought in the
FCPA context. In dismissing the complaint against the individual
135. Jeffrey S. Johnston & Erika A. Tristdn, The Next FCPA Battleground:Private
Civil Lawsuits Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Settlements with U.S.
Government Authorities, VINSON & ELKINS LITIG. NEWS, Winter 2011 at 8, available at
http://www.velaw.com/uploadedFiles/VEsite/Resources/VELitigationNewsWinter2011
.pdf.
136. Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight
Forwarding Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay
More than $156 Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1251.html. There are unique
pleading requirements associated with derivative claims. Ordinarily, a company's
board of directors has the exclusive authority to institute corporate action such as filing
a lawsuit on behalf of the corporation when it has been harmed. However, when the
harm to the corporation is the result of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the
directors, the law recognizes that the board of directors is unlikely to sue itself in such a
situation. Thus, the law provides a mechanism for shareholders to bring a lawsuit, not
in their individual capacity, but on behalf of the corporation to recover monetary
damages for the corporation. Because this derivative action usurps a traditional board
of directors function and can be subject to harassment and abuse, state law often
requires shareholders to first make a demand on the corporation to file suit or to plead
with particularity so-called demand futility, meaning that demand on the board would
be futile because the board is incapable of making an independent judgment concerning
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defendants, the court concluded:
The Complaint merely recites instances whereby certain Individual
Defendants, notably not a majority of them, signed financial forms and
that audit committee meetings took place. Even taking these as true,
nowhere in these allegations is there any indication of a knowing
discharge of their fiduciary duties or a conscious disregard of those
duties. To have a substantial likelihood of director liability on an
oversight claim, a plaintiff must plead the existence of facts suggesting
that the board knew that internal controls were inadequate, that the
inadequacies could leave room for illegal or materially harmful behavior,
and that the board chose to do nothing about the control deficiencies that
it knew existed. The Plaintiff has not alleged any acts to suggest that
Tidewater's internal controls were deficient, much the less that the board
or the Audit Committee had any reason to suspect that they were so. The
conclusory allegation that because illegal behavior occurred, internal
controls must have been deficient and the board must have known so has
been routinely rejected. Ultimately, the Complaint falls woefully short
of pleading facts that are sufficient to show that there was any
knowledge or conscious disregard on behalf of the directors. As a result,
the Plaintiff has failed to plead its claim with particularity and demand is
not excused. . . . While Plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to show that
Tidewater was evidently violating both the FCPA and the Exchange Act,
nowhere in the Complaint do Plaintiffs allegations meet the specificity
to show that the Individual Defendants were acting with the intent to
violate these laws. The mere fact that a violation occurred does not
demonstrate that the board acted in bad faith. Alleging that 'upon
information and belief' the 'Headquarters' made the decision to avoid
tax assessments in violation of the FCPA falls woefully short of the
pleading requirements. Nowhere can this Court find who made this
decision, how this decision was made or that there was an intent to
violate any law. Moreover, the Court finds it significant that Tidewater's
directors voted and voluntarily initiated an FCPA investigation and
advised the federal government of their violations before the government
even suspected any violations.137
the conduct at issue. Most derivative actions, including those in the FCPA context, are
brought as demand futility cases because if a shareholder makes a demand on the board
of directors to bring the claim it will be assumed that the shareholder views the board
of directors as sufficiently independent to analyze the claim and the board's decision
will be analyzed under the board-friendly business judgment rule. To survive a motion
to dismiss, a shareholder pleading demand futility must allege more than conclusory
allegations regarding a breach of fiduciary duty. Rather, the shareholder must allege
with particularly facts suggesting that the majority of directors were interested; that the
directors failed to inform themselves; or that the directors failed to exercise due care as
to the conduct at issue.
137. Strong v. Taylor, 877 F.Supp.2d 433 (E.D. La. 2012).
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Not only was the Tidewater derivative claim representative of the type of
derivative claims frequently brought in the FCPA context, it was also
representative of the outcome. According to an analysis by Professor Amy
Westbrook, "the majority of the recent shareholder derivative suits filed in
the wake of FCPA actions have been dismissed, a handful have settled, and
none have been fully litigated on the merits."l 38
2. Securities Fraud Actions
As previously highlighted, FCPA scrutiny can impact a company's share
price. Thus, it is not surprising that securities fraud class actions are
another frequent form of shareholder litigation following an instance of
FCPA scrutiny.
The securities laws are based on the general premise that issuers must
make full and complete disclosure of all material facts relevant to its
business. Although materiality is a murky concept, courts have construed
this key concept to mean all information, whether positive or negative, that
might be relevant to an investor's decision to buy, sell, or hold a security.' 39
The securities laws' foundation of full and complete disclosure of all
material facts is enforced through, among other provisions, Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act and its associated Rule 1 Ob-5. Section 10(b) generally
prohibits the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the SEC may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors." Rule lOb-5 supplements Section 10(b) by making it unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly - (i) to employ any device, scheme or
artifice to defraud; (ii) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements not
misleading; or (iii) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person - in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Securities fraud claims in the FCPA context generally "allege that a
company's public disclosures regarding potential FCPA violations and/or
the potential settlement with the DOJ or the SEC were misleading in
themselves or were proof of material misstatements in the company's prior
public statements regarding one or more of the following topics:
* the nonexistence of FCPA violations and improper accounting of funds
138. Amy Westbrook, Double Trouble: Collateral Shareholder Litigation Following
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1228 (2012).
139. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988).
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used in illegal activity;
* the quality of the company's internal controls;
* the company's general compliance with corporate policies, the FCPA,
and other applicable laws;
* the risks and costs associated with an FCPA investigation, including
legal and consulting fees and disruptions to the company's operations;
* predictions regarding the results, effects, or ultimate materiality of a
FCPA-related investigation;
* the company's profitability or financial performance following the
cessation of illegal activity and/or any decision to suspend certain
operations due to illegal conduct; and
* the financial impact of increased monitoring expenses." 40
In such cases plaintiffs typically allege that because of the issuer's false
statements or omissions "(1) the market price of the company's securities
was artificially inflated and maintained, and (2) shareholders suffered
losses when the stock price fell following the issuance of corrective
disclosures and the materialization of risks previously concealed by the
defendants (i.e., then the "truth" was revealed)."l41
If an FCPA-related securities fraud class action is fully litigated,
plaintiffs face a heightened pleading standard that is often difficult to
satisfy.14 2  For instance, an institutional investor alleged that InVision
Technologies, along with its CEO and CFO, violated section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 1 Ob-5 in connection with alleged misstatements in
its merger agreement.14 3 The civil action followed InVision's settlement of
an FCPA enforcement action based on payments to foreign sales agents in
China, the Philippines, and Thailand. 144 The enforcement agencies alleged
that InVision knew of the "high probability" that the payments to the
agents would be used to make improper payments to foreign officials and
also alleged that InVision failed to maintain proper internal controls and
failed to adequately train its foreign third parties.14 5
140. Johnston & Tristan, supra note 135, at 8.
141. Id.
142. Under the heightened pleading standard in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act ("PSLRA") complaints alleging misrepresentations or omissions under
Rule lOb-5 must specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or
reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement
or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularlity all facts on which that belief is formed.
143. Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 2008).
144. See generally, Agreement Between the U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Div.,
Fraud Section & InVisionTechs., Inc. (Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.justice
.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/invision-tech/12-03-04invisiontech-agree.pdf.
145. See id. at App. A at 2.
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In the civil action, plaintiff alleged that the merger agreement contained
the following misstatements:
First, . . . the agreement broadly warrants that InVision is 'in compliance
in all material respects with all lawsFalse' Second, . . . the agreement
provides that InVision was in compliance with the [FCPA's] books and
records provisions. Finally, . . . the agreement provides: 'neither the
Company ... nor, to the knowledge of the Company, any director,
officer, agent, employee or other person acting on behalf of the
Company' has violated the [FCPA's] anti-bribery provisions[.]l 46
The court noted the heightened pleading requirements applicable to the
securities fraud claim and the requirement that, among other things, the
plaintiff state with particularly facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendants acted with intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. A
disputed issue was whether the plaintiff "was required to plead scienter as
[to specific individuals], or whether it can rely on a theory of 'collective
scienter,' which would hold the company as a whole responsible for the
statements contained in the merger agreement."
The appellate court held that the plaintiff was required to "plead scienter
with respect to the individuals who actually made the false statements in
the merger agreement." In so holding, the court also observed:
[Plaintiff] argues that the settlement agreements InVision entered into
with the DOJ and SEC are sufficient to create a strong inference of
scenter. In those agreements, InVisi on accepted responsibility for
misconduct and admitted that the company 'was aware of the high
probability that its foreign sales agents or distributors paid or offered to
pay something of value to government officials in order to obtain or
retain business for InVision.' The company further admitted that it
'improperly accounted for certain payments . .. in its books and records
in violation of the FCPA.' The district court correctly held that these
agreements were not sufficient to meet the pleading requirements of the
PSLRA. First, the admissions in these settlement agreements were
largely legal conclusions, rather than particularized facts giving rise to a
strong inference of scienter. More importantly, even if InVision accepted
the SEC's and DOJ's statements of fact, there is nothing in either
settlement agreement that would support the conclusion that [any
specific individuals] had actual knowledge of the violations. As
discussed earlier, the mere fact that someone at InVision had knowledge
of the illegal transactions is not sufficient to satisfy the scienter pleading
requirements of the PSLRA, given the context and limited nature of the
146. Glazer Capital, 549 F.3d at 741-42.
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misrepresentations at issue. 147
Although plaintiffs face a heightened pleading requirement in an FCPA-
related securities fraud action that is often difficult to satisfy, few such
cases are actually litigated. Rather, most cases settle and according to an
analysis by Professor Westbrook, "a number of FCPA-related securities
fraud suits have settled for amounts in excess of the penalty assessed by the
DOJ and/or SEC" in the underlying FCPA enforcement action.148
However, just because certain FCPA-related securities fraud class
actions have settled does not mean that such actions would have succeeded
on the merits. Companies often make the business decision to settle
shareholder litigation (whether derivative actions or securities fraud class
actions in the FCPA context or otherwise) for nuisance value and backed
by insurance coverage.
A typical corporate position concerning settlement of FCPA-related
shareholder litigation was articulated by the Chief Financial Officer of
Maxwell Technologies, a company that resolved an FCPA enforcement
action in 2011.149 During an investor call, the CFO stated:
As we have disclosed in past public filings in 2010, two shareholders had
alleged that certain of our past and current officers and directors failed to
prevent us from violating the [FCPA]. . . . [M]ediation was held and a
proposed settlement was reached wherein $3 million would be paid to
plaintiffs counsels, with $2.7 million to be paid by our insurance carrier,
and $290,000 would be paid by the Company. In addition, we would be
required to insure that certain corporate governance measures are in
place and in force. The agreement is subject to among other things, court
approval and notice to our shareholders. Without admitting any
wrongdoing, the defendants to this suit are willing to enter into this
settlement in order to expedite resolution of the matter, and to relieve the
defendants and the Company from further financial burden. We are
pleased that this suit is near final settlement, and look forward to putting
this matter behind us.lso
As highlighted in this Section, another of the FCPA's many ripples in
this new era is plaintiffs' civil suits against directors and executive officers
147. Id. at 748-49.
148. Westbrook, supra note 138, at 1246.
149. Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Maxwell Technologies Inc. Resolves
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $8 Million Criminal
Penalty (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/201 I/January/1 1-crm-129.html.
150. Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor
.com/friday-roundup-33.
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of companies subject to FCPA scrutiny or enforcement. This is a fact.
However, just as with many other FCPA ripples discussed in this Article,
probing questions need to be asked whether the majority of shareholder
litigation in the FCPA context serves a purpose or is merely a parasitic
attempt to feed-off of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement in this new era.
Indeed, in this new era of FCPA enforcement a component of FCPA Inc.
includes plaintiffs' firms who frequently pounce on FCPA enforcement
actions or instances of FCPA scrutiny. Commenting on this trend, a Forbes
columnist wrote under the title "Plaintiff Lawyers Join The Bribery
Racket" as follows:
The Justice Department's unprecedented campaign to enforce a once-
backwater statute called the [FCPA] has made corporate lawyers and
accountants rich as big companies pay big law and accounting firms to
investigate and defend potential violations. Plaintiff lawyers have
noticed the enormous fees, which are often reaching into the hundreds of
millions of dollars, enhanced FCPA enforcement is generating and are
moving to extract their own cut.... The unintended consequences of the
Justice Department's FCPA policy simply continue to mount. ... Now
the plaintiff lawyers are trying to join the fun. . . . What is clear is that
the cost of enhanced FCPA enforcement on U.S. corporations keeps
going up. And that more lawyers are finding ways to get rich off of it.
When a company's FCPA violations are the result of board of director or
executive officer conduct, or the condoning or encouraging of such conduct
by those with fiduciary duties, such civil suits or investigations would seem
to be warranted and in the public interest. While there have been a few
FCPA enforcement actions alleging such conduct'52 , in the vast majority of
FCPA enforcement actions the enforcement agencies do not allege any
knowledge, participation, or acquiescence in the conduct at issue by the
board of directors or executive officers.153
Rather, based on respondeat superior, a company faces FCPA exposure
because of the actions of a single or small group of employees whose
conduct was often in violation of the company's pre-existing FCPA
151. Nathan Vardi, Plaintiff Lawyers Join The Bribery Racket, FORBES (Aug. 16,
2010 9:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2010/08/16/plaintiff-
lawyers-fcpa-bribery-racket/.
152 Information, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (D.D.C filed Dec. 12,
2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-12-
08siemensakt-info.pdf.
153. See, e.g., Alcoa Inc, Exchange Act Release No. 3525, 2014 WL 69457 at *9
(Jan. 9 2014) (stating that there were "no findings that an officer, director or employee
of Alcoa knowingly engaged in the bribe scheme.").
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compliance policies and procedures and the company's good faith efforts to
comply with the law. In this typical scenario, shareholder litigation would
seem to be merely an attempt by plaintiffs' lawyers to feed-off this new era
of FCPA enforcement.
Testimony at a 2011 House Judiciary Committee hearing by a witness
appearing on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce highlighted the parasitic
nature of much shareholder litigation in the FCPA context and its negative
effects. At the hearing, the witness highlighted specific areas of
"substantial litigation abuse," including "private lawsuits that piggyback on
government investigations."l54 The majority of the testimony focused on
the FCPA and the witness stated:
More recently, the piggyback-litigation phenomenon has been most
noticeable with respect to [FCPA] enforcement proceedings brought by
the [DOJ and SEC]. These piggyback cases tend to fall into two
categories: (1) shareholder class actions alleging that a company did not
adequately disclose its FCPA exposure; and (2) derivative actions
against officers and directors alleging that they failed to prevent a
company from bribing foreign officials.
Follow-on FCPA cases target companies at a difficult time. Companies
going through DOJ or SEC FCPA enforcement proceedings often spend
tens of millions of dollars, if not more, on attorneys and forensic
accountants - on top of potentially multimillion-dollar criminal and civil
fines and disgorgement - in order to determine whether their employees
(often at a relatively low level) acted improperly. Enforcement
proceedings also interrupt normal business operations, as companies
make employees and documents available to lawyers, and take action
against truly culpable employees. The investigations themselves are
disclosable events and are almost always 'bad news,' resulting in
negative publicity. Shareholder suits against companies involved in
enforcement proceedings threaten to further delay the companies' ability
to return to normal operations and to further damage shareholder value.
These suits serve no purpose but to take money from current
shareholders and transfer it to former (or other) shareholders - with a
hefty slice cut out for the plaintiffs' lawyers.
Derivative shareholder suits are equally problematic in this arena. These
suits tend to target senior officers and directors, not the employees who
actually paid any bribes or condoned others paying them. The reason is
simple enough: directors and officers are backed by the deep pockets of
154. Can We Sue Our Way to Prosperity?: Litigation's Effect on America's Global
Competitiveness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 29 (2011) (statement of John H. Beisner, Partner,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP).
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the company's [Director and Officer's] insurer; culpable employees have
little money to pay in private civil damages, especially if they themselves
have been the target of an individual enforcement proceeding.
Often, lawyers filing shareholder class actions against companies under
investigation or derivative actions against directors and officers of a
company under investigation do not even wait until the government
investigation is complete. Such tactics are particularly egregious,
because they necessarily involve the company and senior management in
defending against a private civil suit - and in making strategic judgments
regarding such defense - when their focus should be on resolving the
government's investigation. Both the DOJ and the SEC have developed
leniency policies for companies that actively assist in government
investigations. These policies acknowledge that U.S. government
resources are limited, and that cooperating companies can materially
assist the government in enforcing the law and protecting shareholders.
As part of cooperating with the government, companies in FCPA
investigations frequently investigate their own potential wrongdoing and
self-report misconduct to the government. When companies and their
senior officers and directors face personal civil liability in addition to
any exposure to the DOJ and SEC, their judgments regarding what issues
to investigate and what results to report to the DOJ and SEC necessarily
will be affected, possibly to the detriment of the integrity of the
government's investigation. 55
As with many issues in this new era of FCPA enforcement, FCPA-related
shareholder litigation seems to have spiraled out of control and an FCPA
practitioner rightly observed:
Setbacks in court do not appear to have slowed the pace of new cases
filed against corporations and their directors after FCPA disclosures. As
the DOJ and SEC bring more cases, and as more companies voluntarily
disclose potential FCPA violations, the trend of related civil litigation is
likely to continue. In attempting to satisfy the expectations of the DOJ
and SEC, a company's thorough internal investigation may also serve as
the roadmap for a civil litigant. Companies negotiating with the DOJ and
SEC must therefore balance the government's requests for the results of
internal investigations with the risk of waiver of privilege and
subsequent production to civil litigants. As a result of these practical
considerations, reputational risk, and expenses involved in litigation,
companies targeted by civil suits will feel pressure to settle, potentially
even before the DOJ or SEC takes action.
155. Id.
156. James G. Tillen and Lauren H. Torbett, Multiplying the Risks: Parallel Civil
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Regardless of the substantive merits of much FCPA-related shareholder
litigation, the fact remains that such civil litigation following an FCPA
enforcement action or instance of FCPA scrutiny represents yet another
instance of the FCPA's many ripples.
G. Offensive Use of the FCPA
Whether it's a DOJ or SEC FCPA enforcement action or an FCPA-
related civil suit by plaintiffs' lawyers representing shareholders,
companies are ordinarily in a defensive posture when it comes to the
FCPA. Even if a company is not involved in an FCPA investigation or
related litigation, the FCPA still usually frustrates a business objective such
as not acquiring a foreign target or not engaging a foreign agent because of
FCPA risk. While such defensive positions continue to dominate, this
Section highlights how the FCPA is increasingly being used offensively by
companies to achieve a business objective or to further advance a litigating
position.
For instance, in 2013, Dish Network and Tokyo-based SoftBank were
battling for control of wireless carrier Sprint Nextel. Among the regulatory
approvals needed for SoftBank to complete the transaction was Federal
Communications Commission's ("FCC") approval of a license transfer
from Sprint Nextel to SoftBank. In opposing the transfer, Dish Network
cited a 2009 FCPA enforcement action against UTStarcom in which the
company agreed to pay $3 million via a DOJ NPA and SEC civil settlement
"for the actions of UTS-China (its wholly-owned subsidiary) and its
employees and agents, who arranged and paid for employees of Chinese
state-owned telecommunications companies to travel to popular tourist
destinations in the United States, including Hawaii, Las Vegas and New
York City."i 57
The link Dish Network made between the FCPA enforcement action and
its battle with SoftBank for Sprint Nextel was that Softbank's founder
Masayoshi Son was on the board of UTStarcom during certain time periods
relevant to the conduct at issue in the FCPA enforcement action. Dish
Network asserted that the UTStarcom enforcement action was "relevant to
the public interest analysis of the proposed transaction."' 58  In reply,
Litigation in FCPA Investigations, 2 BLOOMBERG L. REPS. - White Collar Crime, no.
10, 2010, available at http://www.millerchevalier.com/portalresource/lookup/poid/Z
tOl9NP I OLTYnMQZ56TfzcRVPMQiLsSwG3Em83!/document.name=/millerchevali
er tillen torbett article.pdf.
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Softbank stated that the UTStarcom enforcement action was not relevant to
its attempt to gain control of Sprint Nextel and asserted:
[The enforcement action did] not involve SoftBank or Mr. Masayoshi
Son, Chairman and CEO of SoftBank. The settlement documents do not
name, implicate, or otherwise relate to SoftBank or Mr. Son, and are
legally and factually irrelevant to this proceeding."
"DISH suggests that these settlements raise a potential issue in this
proceeding because Mr. Son at one time served as the Chairman of the
Board of UTSI. Neither the DOJ or SEC settlement documents,
however, even mention SoftBank or Mr. Son. This is hardly surprising.
Mr. Son was not an operating officer of UTStarcom at any time and the
alleged violations came to light years after Mr. Son left the Board, which
he did in 2004. The FCPA-related misconduct, according to the
settlement documents, involved an executive of the company's Chinese
subsidiary, UTStarcom China Co., Ltd.159
Another example of offensive use of the FCPA in a battle for corporate
control involved Central European Distribution Corporation ("CEDC"), a
large vodka producer headquartered in the U.S. In 2012, CEDC disclosed:
There has been a breach of the books and records provisions of the
[FCPA] and potentially other breaches of the FCPA. It was determined
that payments or gifts were made in a foreign jurisdiction in which the
Company operates, and that there was a failure to maintain
documentation in respect of certain of these payments or gifts adequate
to establish whether there was a valid business purpose in making the
payments or gifts. Furthermore, our management also identified a
material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting
regarding the implementation of our policy on compliance with
applicable laws. . . . Our conclusion that this deficiency is a material
weakness in our internal control over financial reporting is not based on
misstatements in our historical consolidated financial statements or our
consolidated financial statements, . . . but instead on the determination
that we did not design or maintain sufficient policies, procedures,
controls, communications or training to deter or prevent the risk of
violations of law, including the [FCPA]. 160
Shortly thereafter, Russian billionaire Roustam Tariko, the founder of
CEDC's rival Russian Standard and CEDC's largest shareholder, claimed
159. Id.




that CEDC executives themselves were the subject of an FCPA
investigation. The claims of CEDC's largest shareholder caused the
company to issue a letter to shareholders that stated:
As you may be aware. . . Mr. Roustam Tariko, Chairman of Russian
Standard, published a letter to CEDC investors that has created anxiety
and confusion in the marketplace. What you may not be aware of is that
Mr. Tariko's letter was published less than 48 hours after the CEDC
Board voted 5 to 3 (the 3 being Mr. Tariko and his Board designees)
against Mr. Tariko's request that he be given total control over CEDC's
operations and finance. This request follows repeated attempts by
Russian Standard to remove the interim CEO. The purpose of this letter
is to provide you with [among other things] correct information
regarding FCPA matters.' 6'
The letter then stated that "despite suggestions in the Russian Standard
letter to the contrary, the company is NOT on notice that any of its current
executives are under investigation with respect to FCPA violations or
otherwise." 62
Perhaps the most high-profile instance of offensive use of the FCPA
involved the boardroom battle between Wynn Resorts and its board
member Kazuo Okada. In early 2012, Wynn Resorts disclosed:
In May 2011, Wynn Macau, a majority owned subsidiary of Wynn
Resorts, Limited (the "Company"), made a commitment to the
University of Macau Development Foundation in support of the new
Asia-Pacific Academy of Economics and Management. This contribution
consists of a $25 million payment made in May 2011 and a commitment
for additional donations of $10 million each year for the calendar years
2012 through 2022 inclusive. The pledge was consistent with the
Company's longstanding practice of providing philanthropic support for
deserving institutions in the markets in which it operates. The pledge was
made following an extensive analysis which concluded that the gift was
made in accordance with all applicable laws. The pledge was considered
by the Boards of Directors of both the Company and Wynn Macau and
approved by 15 of the 16 directors who serve on those boards. The sole
dissenting vote was Mr. Kazuo Okada whose stated objection was to the
length of time over which the donation would occur, not its propriety.
Also as previously disclosed, Mr. Okada commenced litigation . . . in
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to the donation to the University of Macau, among other things. . . .
Following Mr. Okada's lawsuit, the Company received a letter from the
[SEC] requesting that, in connection with an informal inquiry by the
SEC, the Company preserve information relating to the donation to the
University of Macau, any donations by the Company to any other
educational charitable institutions, including the University of Macau
Development Foundation, and the Company's casino or concession
gaming licenses or renewals in Macau. The Company intends to fully
comply with the SEC's request. 63
While Wynn's disclosure did not specifically mention the FCPA, given
that the company's disclosure of the SEC inquiry appeared to link the
donation to the "Company's casino or concession gaming licenses or
renewals in Macau," the disclosure implicated the FCPA. As Okada
alleged in his complaint "Wynn Macau's gaming concession expires in
June 2022 - the last year of Wynn's donation commitment." According to
Okada's complaint, he objected to the donation, called it unprecedented in
University history, and claimed that the Chinese government owned the
land on which the University is located.
Shortly thereafter, Wynn accused Okada of separate and distinct conduct
that could implicate the FCPA. In a press release, Wynn announced that its
"Compliance Committee has concluded a year-long investigation after
receiving an independent report detailing numerous apparent violations of
the [FCPA] by Aruze USA, Inc., its parent company Universal
Entertainment Corporation, and its principal shareholder, Kazuo Okada." 64
In the release, Wynn noted that its Compliance Committee engaged a
variety of experts, including Louis Freeh (the former Director of the FBI),
who conducted "a thorough independent investigation" which "uncovered
and documented more than three dozen instances over a three-year period
in which Mr. Okada and his associates engaged in improper activities for
their own benefit in apparent violation of U.S. anti-corruption laws and
gross disregard for the Company's Code of Conduct."' 6 ' According to the
release, "Mr. Okada and his associates and companies appear to have
engaged in a longstanding practice of making payments and gifts to his two
chief gaming regulators at the Philippines Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, who directly oversaw and regulated Mr. Okada's Provisional
163. Wynn Resorts $135 Million University of Macau Donation the Subject of SEC
Scrutiny, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/wynn-
resorts-whopping- 1 35-million-university-of-macau-donation-the-subject-of-sec-
scrutiny.
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Licensing Agreement to operate in that country." 6 6
The Wynn releases further stated:
The Board has requested that Mr. Okada resign as a Director of Wynn
Resorts. The Company will immediately inform the Board of Directors
of its Hong Kong listed subsidiary, Wynn Macau, Limited, of its actions
and will recommend that Mr. Okada be removed from the Wynn Macau
Board. . . . The Freeh Report is the culmination of a year-long
investigation by the Compliance Committee based on increasing
concerns the Board had relating to the activities of Mr. Okada and Aruze
USA, Inc. in the Philippines and statements made by Mr. Okada to
Wynn Resorts' Directors that gifts to regulators are permissible in Asia.
Mr. Okada is the only Director of Wynn Resorts who has continued to
refuse to sign the Company's Code of Conduct or participate in
mandatory Foreign Corrupt Practices Act training for Directors."1 67
Wynn's FCPA allegations against Okada were used by the company to
support its finding that Okada was an "unsuitable person" under Nevada
gaming regulations thus justifying Okada's removal from Wynn's board.168
Moreover, the boardroom battle occurred in the context of Wynn's attempt
to purchase Okada's 20% stake in Wynn at an approximate 30% discount.
Okada ultimately resigned from Wynn's board and in doing so stated: "I
no longer believe it is appropriate for me to serve on the Board of Directors
of a company that is behaving in a manner that I deeply believe to be
unethical."l 69
In addition to the FCPA being used offensively to achieve a business
objective, the FCPA is also being used offensively to advance litigating
positions. As previously indicated, while certain courts have held that the
FCPA does not contain a private right of action, plaintiffs have
nevertheless frequently brought causes of action under the Racketeer
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170. To establish a violation of any of the substantive offenses under RICO, a
plaintiff must show that defendants engaged in a "pattern of racketeering," which
requires at least two acts of racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012) A
violation of the Travel Act is one of the enumerated predicate offenses under RICO.
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For instance, in 2008 Aluminum Bahrain BSC ("Alba"), one of the
largest aluminum smelters in the world owned by, among others, the
government of Bahrain, filed a civil lawsuit against Alcoa Inc., the world's
leading producer of primary aluminum products, and others alleging RICO
violations. The complaint alleged that certain Alcoa entities and their
agents engaged in a conspiracy over a 15 year period to defraud Alba and
specifically alleged that the defendants: (i) illegally bribed officials of the
government of Bahrain and /or officers of Alba in order to force Alba to
purchase alumina at excessively high prices; (ii) illegally bribed officials of
the government of Bahrain and /or officers of Alba and issued threats in
order to pressure Alba to enter into an agreement by which Alcoa would
purchase an equity interest in Alba; and (iii) assigned portions of existing
supply contracts between Alcoa and Alba for the sole purpose of
facilitating alleged bribes and unlawful commissions.17 '
After the judge denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, Alcoa agreed
to settle the case by paying Alba approximately $85 million and the action
represented the "first time that a foreign-owned corporation has
successfully sued a U.S. company in a federal court to recover losses
suffered due to allegations of corrupt activity."' 72
While FCPA-related civil litigation often involves RICO claims, such
civil cases have also involved other causes of action as well. For instance,
after Innospec resolved an FCPA enforcement action, NewMarket Corp., a
competitor company, learned of Innospec's conduct from the DOJ and SEC
resolution documents, including allegations that Innospec's bribe payments
in Iraq ensured that a field test of a competitor's product failed. 73 Based
on Innospec's acknowledgment of this conduct in resolving the FCPA
enforcement action, NewMarket filed a civil case against Innospec alleging
The Travel Act, enacted prior to the FCPA, is part of the racketeering chapter of the
criminal code and prohibits interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of
racketeering enterprises. Specifically, the Travel Act prohibits travel in interstate or
foreign commerce or use of the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce
with intent to, among other things, carry on "any unlawful activity" which is defined to
include bribery in violation of state law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012). In short,
conduct in violation of the FCPA is often in violation of state law, which in turn
implicates the Travel Act, which in turn can implicate RICO given that a Travel Act
violation is a predicate act under RICO.
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violations of the Robinson-Patman Act, the Virginia Antitrust Act, and the
Virginia Business Conspiracy Act.174 Innospec agreed to resolve the case
by agreeing to pay NewMarket approximately $45 million. 75
The trend of offensive use of the FCPA to advance litigating positions is
not just limited to business organizations. Individuals are also increasingly
citing the FCPA to support claims of wrongful termination of employment.
For instance, Khaled Asadi, a former employee of a wholly-owned
subsidiary of General Electric Company ("G.E."), filed a civil complaint
alleging that G.E. harassed and pressured him to vacate his position and
ultimately terminated him after he informed his supervisor and G.E.'s
Ombudsperson "regarding potential violations of the FCPA committed by
G.E. during negotiations for a lucrative, multi-year deal with the Iraqi
Ministry of Electricity."' 76
Likewise, Stephen Lowe, a former Allison Transmission Managing
Director for operations in China, Japan, and Korea, filed a civil complaint
against the company alleging that Allison fired him because he "refused to
engage in violations of the FCPA." Among other things, Lowe alleged
that: (i) he witnessed Allison's Commercial Director of Asia Strategy
deliver a cash filled envelope to Beijing City Bus officials during dinner;
(ii) he heard the Commercial Director describe how he purchased silver
jewelry for Chinese government officials "in order to please the officials;"
(iii) the Commercial Director bragged about winning a Beijing City Bus
Olympics contract by doing "whatever it took to please the officials"
"including giving gifts, money and prostitutes;" and (iv) the Commercial
Director "deliberately lost" high-stakes card games to "key Beijing City
Bus officials." According to Lowe's complaint, Allison's Vice President
of International Sales and Marketing knew and approved of certain of the
Commercial Director's conduct and Lowe further alleged that "a month
before Allison fired him" he disclosed his concerns about the Commercial
Director and the Vice President to Allison's Marketing Manager.17 7
Such "noisy exits" by employees alleging wrongful termination of
employment can also be the origins of high-profile FCPA scrutiny of the
company involved. For instance, casino company Las Vegas Sands has
been the subject of FCPA scrutiny since 2010 when Steven Jacobs, the
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former President of the company's Macau operations, filed a civil
complaint against the company alleging breach of contract and tort-based
causes of action.'78 Jacobs alleged, among other things, that the company's
"notoriously bellicose" CEO and majority shareholder made several
"outrageous demands" upon him, including "demands that Sands China
continue to use the legal services of a Macau attorney . .. despite concerns
that the individual's retention posed serious risks" under the FCPA. 17 9 The
civil lawsuit has led to enforcement agency scrutiny of Las Vegas Sands
under the FCPA and other laws.
While the FCPA is a law exclusively enforced by the DOJ and SEC, the
take-away point from Part II of this Article is that the FCPA has many
other ripples as well. Whether it is the many negative business effects of
FCPA scrutiny, FCPA-related civil litigation against corporate directors or
executives, or offensive use of the FCPA to achieve a business objective or
advance litigating positions, actual FCPA enforcement actions by the
enforcement agencies are often only a relatively minor component of the
overall business consequences that can result from FCPA scrutiny or
enforcement in this new era.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the many ripples of FCPA scrutiny and
enforcement in this new era. By highlighting that settlement amounts in an
actual FCPA enforcement action are often only a relatively minor
component of the overall financial consequences that can result from FCPA
scrutiny or enforcement, this Article shifts the FCPA conversation away
from being a purely legal issue to its more proper designation as a general
business issue that needs to be on the radar screen of various business
managers operating in the global marketplace. In shifting the conversation,
business managers should view the importance of FCPA compliance more
holistically and not merely through the narrow lens of actual enforcement
actions.
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